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FROM "NAVIGABLE WATERS" TO "CONSTITUTIONAL
WATERS": THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL WETLANDS
REGULATIONt
Mark Squillace*
Wetlands regulation in the United States has a tumultuous history. The early
European settlers viewed wetlands as obstacles to development, and they drained
and filled wetlands and swamps at an astounding rate, often with government
support, straight through the middle of the twentieth century. As evidence of the
ecological significance of wetlands emerged over the last several decades, programs
to protect and restore wetlands became prominent. Most notable among these is the
permitting program under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. That provision
prohibits dredging or filling of "navigable waters, " defined by law to mean "waters
of the United States." Since 1975, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the
Corps), which is primarily responsible for the section 404 permitting program, has
construed "navigable waters" expansively to encompass most wetlands that could
affect interstate commerce. In three decisions over the course of twenty years, the
Supreme Court has expressed increasing skepticism that the phrase "navigable wa-
ters" supports the Corps' broad claim of regulatory authority. In its most recent
decision, United States v. Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006), a majority of the
Court found that the phrase "navigable waters" encompassed only those waters
that met the traditional test for navigability.
This Article considers the state of federal wetlands regulation after Rapanos. It
begins by describing the significant role that wetlands play in the ecological health
of the planet, and the impracticality of setting standards to protect those wetlands
at the state or local level. It then examines the history of wetlands regulation, fo-
cusing in particular on the Clean Water Act, and the problems encountered with
regulating wetlands by federal agencies and in the courts. The Article concludes
with recommendations for improving the section 404 program. While the Corps
can and perhaps should adopt rules to clarify the law, the time is long overdue for
Congress to amend the Clean Water Act to clarify the scope of federal authority
over wetlands. In doing so, Congress should affirm its original intent to establish
a comprehensive federal program for wetlands regulation under the Clean Water
Act. This can best be accomplished by abandoning the ill-fated use of the phrase
"navigable waters" and substituting a new phrase such as "constitutional wa-
ters," which will clearly convey Congress's intent to encompass all waters that are
subject to federal jurisdiction under the constitution.
t @ 2007 by Mark Squillace. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colo-
rado School of Law. I am greatly indebted to my research assistant, Ben Doyle, andJonathan
Hanna, Research Associate at the Natural Resources Law Center, for the extraordinary assis-
tance they provided me in preparing this Article.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Wetlands are among our most important ecological resources.
They provide habitat for fish and wildlife; they protect and im-
prove our water quality; and-as we learned in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina-they store floodwaters and protect inland
property from the catastrophic consequences of tropical storms.'
But private landowners rarely profit from protecting these vital at-
tributes of wetlands. Because wetlands are frequently associated
with open water their development value is often higher than for
dry lands,2 which only heightens the prospect for conflict between
land conservation and development.
Draining wetlands to promote agricultural and other uses has a
long tradition in this country and was historically viewed as a way to
"reclaim" lands for productive purposes.3 More recently, private
owners have claimed the right to fill in wetlands to accommodate a
wide range of construction projects, from single family homes to
shopping malls.' The economic benefits of filling wetlands to the
private landowner can be substantial. Efforts by the government to
limit or control such development are controversial and can give
rise to claims that a landowner's property rights have been taken in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.!
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") exer-
cises regulatory authority over wetlands development through
1. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), OFFICE OF WATER, EPA843-F-06-001, WETLANDS:
PROTECTING LIFE AND PROPERTY FROM FLOODING (May 2006), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/Flooding.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Life's a Beach, Bus. DAY, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/
TarkArticle.aspx?ID=2414471 (discussing the common-knowledge fact that beachfront prop-
erty is more valuable than non-beachfront property).
3. See, e.g., RALPH E. HEIMLICH ET AL., WETLANDS AND AGRICULTURE: PRIVATE INTER-
ESTS AND PUBLIC BENEFITS, AGRIC. ECON. REP. No. 765, at 18-23 (1998) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/aer765/aer765e.pdf; see also infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
4. All Things Considered: Divided Supreme Court Rules on Wetlands Laws (National Public
Radio broadcast June 19, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld=5496382.
5. The Fifth Amendment precludes the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Takings claims have been raised in many
wetlands cases. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding that a regu-
lation which precluded use of fill on wetlands and thus development of beach club on
wetlands portion of 18-acre tract, but which permitted landowner to build substantial resi-
dence on uplands portion of tract, leaving parcel with $200,000 in development value, did
not deprive landowner of all economic use of entire parcel so as to support takings claim
under Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)); Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n of
Old Lyme, 282 A.2d 907, 910 (Conn. 1971) (holding that an owner barred from filling tidal
marshland must be compensated, despite municipality's "laudable" goal of "preserv[ing]
marshlands from encroachment or destruction"); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d
287 (N.H. 1984) (holding that owner may, without compensation, be barred from filling
wetlands because land-filling would deprive adjacent coastal habitats and marine fisheries of
ecological support).
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Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which generally prohibits "the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters [of
the United States]" without a permit from the Corps." Since as
early as 1975, the Corps has construed its authority to regulate wet-
lands development broadly, and as a result, most private
landowners who wish to develop wetlands have been required to
obtain a "dredge and fill" permit.
7
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to consider the
scope of the Corps' authority under Section 404 on three occa-
sions. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Court held
that a permit was required to develop wetlands adjacent to naviga-
ble waters.8 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC)
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Court held that the scope of the
law did not reach to waters that were "isolated" from navigable wa-
ters, even where those waters were frequented by migratory birds.9
Most recently, in Rapanos v. United States, the Court was divided as
to whether the law encompasses wetlands with a less obvious con-
nection to navigable waters than those at issue in Riverside.'
This Article considers the future of wetlands regulation after Ra-
panos. It begins with a brief review of wetlands ecology and wetland
trends in the United States. It then describes the evolution of wet-
lands regulation in the United States through Rapanos and pays
special attention to the issues raised in Rapanos and their previous
treatment in the diverse opinions from the Court. The Article con-
cludes with a discussion of federal wetlands policy. Because the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Corps have not
taken regulatory action to address the ambiguities created by the
SWANCC and Rapanos decisions, and because any such effort would
likely fall short of the fundamental reform that is needed, the time
has come for Congress to act. Given the important role that wet-
lands play in the ecological health of the planet and the
impracticality of setting standards at the state level, Congress
should affirm its commitment to a comprehensive federal program
for wetlands regulation. Congress should abandon the phrase
"navigable waters" in favor of a new phrase, such as "constitutional
waters" in order to encompass unambiguously all waters subject to
federal jurisdiction under the Constitution.
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
7. See infra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
8. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
9. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
10. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
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I. UNDERSTANDING WETLANDS AND WETLANDS ECOLOGY
For purposes of the Section 404 program, the EPA and the
Corps have defined wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions."" Using this definition, the EPA has de-
scribed four different categories of wetlands: marshes, swamps,
bogs, and fens.12 This Part describes wetlands and their economic,
environmental, and social value in order to demonstrate the im-
portance of wetlands regulation.
Marshes may be tidal or non-tidal.' 3 Tidal marshes are found
along protected coastlines. 4 They can be freshwater, brackish, or
saline, but they are all influenced by ocean tides. 5 Tidal wetlands
provide a buffer against storms, help minimize shoreline erosion,
and provide food and shelter for aquatic species and migratory wa-
ll. Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2006) (Corps);
Definitions, 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2006) (EPA). A 2004 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Report describes the respective roles of the Corps and EPA as follows:
The Corps administers the permitting responsibilities of the section 404 program,
while EPA in conjunction with the Corps establishes the substantive environmental
protection standards that permit applicants must meet. EPA also has final administra-
tive responsibility for interpreting the term "waters of the United States," a term that
governs the scope of many other programs that EPA administers under the Clean Wa-
ter Act. Day-to-day authority for administering the permitting program rests with the
38 Corps district offices, whereas Corps division and headquarters offices exercise
policy oversight. Under section 404(q), EPA and other federal agencies, such as the
Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service, can request that a permit ap-
plication receive a higher level of review within the Department of the Army. Under a
memorandum of agreement between EPA and the Corps, EPA may also initiate a
"special case," in which EPA determines the scope ofjurisdiction for a particular site
or issue for section 404 purposes. EPA also has "veto" authority over section 404 per-
mitting decisions under section 404(c). However, EPA has rarely used its 404(c)
authority to intervene in or overrule Corps permit decisions. EPA also exercises inde-
pendent enforcement authority.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-297, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON ENERGY POLICY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: WATER AND WETLANDS-CORPS OF
ENGINEERS NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS DISTRICT OFFICE PRACTICES IN DETERMINING JURISDIC-
TION 5 (2004) [hereinafter GAO-04-297], available at, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04297.pdf; see also 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 197 (1979).
12. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetland Types, http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/types/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
13. Environmental Protection Agency, Marshes, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/





terfowl.' They also absorb excess nutrients that deplete oxygen
levels when they reach oceans and estuaries, thereby making these
areas unsuitable for aquatic life.' 7 Non-tidal marshes are the most
common type of wetlands in North America.' They are usually
freshwater marshes and often occur near streams, lakes, ponds,
and rivers. 9 Non-tidal marshes generally contain highly organic,
mineral-rich soils.2 0 Typical vegetation includes lily pads, cattails,
reeds, and bulrushes that afford excellent habitat for a wide range
of waterfowl and small mammals, such as red-winged blackbirds,
great blue herons, otters, and muskrats.21 Non-tidal marshes in-
clude prairie potholes, playa lakes, vernal pools, and wet
meadows.22
Swamps are forested or shrub-based and are dominated by
woody plants and characterized by saturated soils. 3 Like marshes,
swamps offer flood protection and remove excess nutrients that are
often generated by agricultural activities. 4 Alluvial deposits from
flooding in swamps provide a rich habitat for a wide range of spe-
cies.25
"[Bogs] are characterized by spongy peat deposits, acidic waters,
and a floor covered by a thick carpet of sphagnum moss."26 Bogs
include northern bogs that are found in the northeast and Great







22. Id. Five to seven million migratory waterfowl, including more than half of Ameri-
can ducks and the endangered whooping crane use prairie potholes as way stations for food,
rest, and breeding. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, EPA 843-F-06-004, ECONOMIC
BENEFITS OF WETLANDS (May 2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/
pdf/EconomicBenefits.pdf. Potholes also play an important role in recharging aquifers.
SOUTH DAKOTA WATER RESEARCH INSTITUTE ANNUAL TECHNICAL REPORT 8 (1999), available
at http://wri.sdstate.edu/Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%201999.pdf.
23. According to the EPA:
A swamp is any wetland dominated by woody plants. There are many different kinds
of swamps, ranging from the forested red maple, (Acer rubrum), swamps of the North-
east, to the extensive bottomland hardwood forests found along the sluggish rivers of
the Southeast. Swamps are characterized by saturated soils during the growing sea-
son, and standing water during certain times of the year.
Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Swamps, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/
types/swamp.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Bogs, http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/types/bog.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
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coastal plain." Bogs absorb a great deal of water and protect up-
lands from flooding. 8 In addition, peat bogs act as carbon sinks"S
Finally, fens, like bogs, are peat-forming wetlands.30 Unlike bogs,
fens receive nutrients from sources other than precipitation such
as surface drainage or groundwater.3 ' As a result, fens are less
acidic and richer in nutrients than bogs and are able to support a
more diverse plant and animal community.
32
Wetlands may not be wet all year round,33 but as the agency defi-
nition suggests, they must under normal conditions support or be
capable of supporting wetlands vegetation.34 As described more
fully below, wetlands delineation for purposes of section 404 re-
quires a scientific assessment of a given property to determine the
presence of distinctive soils, plants, and hydrology that characterize
wetlands. 5
"A wetland's characteristics evolve when hydrologic conditions
cause the water table to saturate or inundate the soil for a certain
amount of time each year., 36 Even minute fluctuations in hydrology
can significantly alter the soil chemistry and plant and animal
communities.3 7 Typical examples of changes that alter the habitat
include: (1) deposition of fill material for development; (2) drain-
age of land for development, farming, and mosquito control; (3)
dredging and stream channelization for navigation; (4) develop-
ment and flood control; (5) diking and damming to form ponds
and lakes; (6) diversion of flow to or from wetlands; and (7) addi-
tion of impervious surfaces in the watershed in a manner that
increases runoff into wetlands.8
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Bronwyn Chester, The Case of the Missing Sink, 32 MCGILL REP. 15, Apr. 20, 2000,
available at http://www.mcgill.ca/reporter/32/15/roulet/ ("[Twenty-five] percent of the
carbon in land plants and soils is stored in peat deposits[;] ... peat bogs, the world over, act
as storage for approximately ten percent of all 'fixed' carbon, meaning the carbon taken up
by mosses and flora.... ").
30. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Fens, http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/types/fen.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). "Acre for acre, [swamps] often equal
rainforests in biological variety." Bruce Selcraig, What is a Wetland?, 81 SIERRA 44, 46 (May-
June 1996); see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, EPA 843-F-04-01 1A, WETLANDS
OVERVIEW (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/overview.pdf.
31. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Fens, supra note 30.
32. Id.
33. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22.
34. See supra text accompanying note 11.
35. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the wetlands delineation process.
36. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, EPA 843-F-01-002o, THREATS TO WET-





Wetlands are prized for many reasons, including their aesthetic
values:' But wetlands also provide important ecosystem services to
plant, animal, and human communities. Wetlands serve as natural
wastewater treatment facilities, filtering out pollutants and improv-
ing water quality.4 0 They absorb the impact of floods and stabilize
runoff by retaining water and releasing it gradually.4 Wetlands
similarly temper catastrophic climatic events.
42
Wetlands are "nurseries of life 43 that serve as home to millions
of plants and animals that rely on them for food, habitat, and
breeding grounds." Although they cover less than five percent of
the land surface, wetlands host thirty-one percent of all plant
species in the lower forty-eight states. 45 They are among the most
fertile and biologically productive ecosystems in the world, rivaling
tropical rainforests and coral reefs in the number and diversity of
species they support.46 More than one-third of threatened or
39. See Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Recreation and Aesthetics,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/recreation.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). "Just
watching the wildlife, many of which depend on wetlands, has become a popular pastime.
More than 66 million people 16 years old and older-31% of all Americans--fed, photo-
graphed and observed wildlife in 2001 and spent $40 billion on their activities." ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22. Wetlands provide a place
of natural beauty and solitude that can be enjoyed by persons of all ages who may seldom be
exposed to nature. Id.
40. According to the EPA:
Because natural wetlands are so effective at removing pollutants from water that flows
through them, engineers and scientists construct systems that replicate some of the
functions of natural wetlands. These constructed treatment wetlands use natural
processes involving wetland vegetation, soils and their associated microbial life to im-
prove water quality. They are often less expensive to build than traditional wastewater
and stormwater treatment options, have low operating and maintenance expenses
and can handle fluctuating water levels .... There are hundreds of wastewater treat-
ment wetlands operating in the United States today.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22.
41. Id.
42. TE. DAHL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., WETLANDS
LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES 1780S TO 1980s 2 (1990).
43. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS OVERVIEW, supra note 30.
44. See Selcraig, supra note 30. Wetlands sustain and promote biodiversity by providing
habitat to more than 5,000 species of plants, 190 kinds of amphibians, and one-third of all
the bird species in the United States. See id. at 45. "Two-thirds of the 10-12 million waterfowl
of the continental US reproduce in the prairie pothole wetlands of the Midwest. In the win-
ter millions of ducks like these can be found in the wetlands of the south-central United
States." EVNTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS OVERVIEW, supra note 30. As many as one-half of
all North American bird species nest or feed in wetlands. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC
BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22.
45. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22.
46. Id.
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endangered species live only in wetlands, and many species are
dependent on wetlands to reproduce.8
Wetlands also play an important role in our economic well-
being. By improving drinking water quality, minimizing the dam-
age done by floods, providing outstanding recreational
opportunities, attracting businesses to areas rich in biodiversity
and natural beauty, and providing raw materials and employment
opportunities for numerous commercial concerns, wetlands pro-
mote a robust economy.50 As a reliable source of food, shelter, and
nursery grounds for both marine and freshwater species, wetlands
are a cornerstone of the nation's multibillion dollar fishing indus-
try. They provide an essential link in the life cycle of seventy-five
percent of the fish and shellfish commercially harvested in the
United States and up to ninety percent of the recreational fish
catch. 52 Two-thirds of all fish consumed worldwide depend on
47. An additional twenty percent of the country's threatened or endangered species
use or inhabit wetlands at some time in their life. Id.
48. Id.
49. According to the EPA:
Wetlands are often inviting places for popular recreational activities including hiking,
fishing, bird watching, photography and hunting. More than 82 million Americans
took part in these activities in 2001, spending more than $108 billion on these pur-
suits. For example, over 34 million people went fishing in 2001, spending an average
of $1,046 and 16 days each on the water. Anglers spent $14.7 billion in 2001 for fish-
ing trips, $17 billion on equipment and $4 billion for licenses, stamps, tags, land
leasing and ownership, membership dues, contributions and magazines. The overall
economic impact of recreational fishing is estimated at $116 billion [according to the
American Sportfishing Association], and wetlands play a crucial role in the life cycle
of up to 90 percent of the fish caught recreationally. In 2001, approximately 3 million
people hunted migratory birds, and 6.5 million small mammals that are often found
in wetlands. They spent more than $2.2 billion, including $111 million paid by migra-
tory bird and large game hunters to lease hunting areas and blinds, often located on
private properties with wetlands [according to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service].
Each year nearly $200 million in hunters' federal excise taxes are distributed to state
agencies to support wildlife management programs, the purchase of lands open to
hunters and hunter education and safety classes. Proceeds from the federal Duck
Stamp, a required purchase of migratory water fowl hunters, have purchased more




51. Landings of crab, shrimp and salmon were valued at $1,167 billion in 2004. Id. In
2004 the dockside value of fin fish and shellfish landed in the United States was $3.7 billion
and was the basis for the $7.2 billion fishery processing business. Id. According to the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. consumers spent an estimated $54.4 billion for fishery prod-
ucts in 2000. Id.
52. It is not just the fishing industry that derives benefits or produces products de-
pendent on wetlands. As the EPA notes:
From "Navigable Waters"
coastal wetlands at some stage in their life cycle. s Water flushing
through wetlands also provides needed transportation for migra-
tory fish species. 4 Wetlands play a major role in the production of
cash crops such as marsh hay, wild rice, blueberries, cranberries,
peat moss, and timber.'5
Another important and often overlooked aspect of wetlands is
their role in the hydrologic cycle.5 ' The dense vegetation and
sediment typically found in wetlands not only purifies water that
runs through the wetlands, 7 but it also stabilizes the land and pro-
tects adjacent communities during floods and storms.5 8  By
absorbing and storing a significant amount of floodwater, wetlands
act as natural buffers, reducing the frequency and intensity of
Part of this economic value lies in the variety of commercial products they provide,
such as food and energy sources. Rice can be grown in a wetland during part of the
year, and the same area can serve as a wildlife habitat for the rest of the year. Some
wetland plant species, such as wild rice and various reeds, can be harvested for or
used to produce specialty foods, medicines, cosmetics and decorative items. In many
coastal and river delta wetlands, haying of wetland vegetation is important to livestock
producers. In Europe, reed-growing for building materials is undergoing a revival in
some countries as people realize the full potential of reeds as a roofing material. Aes-
thetically pleasing, thatched roofs are superior insulators to conventional tile roofs,
and they have a life span of 25-40 years. Fur-bearing animals, such as mink, muskrat
and beaver, use wetlands during some part of their life cycle. Income can be derived
from trapping these furbearers, either by direct sale of their pelts or by leasing wet-
lands for the fur harvest. The nation's harvest of muskrat pelts alone was worth $124
million in 2004. Wetlands also provide employment opportunities, including such
positions as surveyor or park ranger. The production of raw materials from wetlands
provides jobs to those employed in the commercial fishing, specialty food and cos-




54. Selcraig, supra note 30, at 46.
55. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22.
56. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS OVERVIEW, supra note 30.
57. The Clean Water Network: Wetland Protection, http://www.
cleanwaternetwork.org/cwn/issues/wetlands/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). The
average wetland can store about three-acre feet of water, or one million gallons. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22.
58. According to the EPA, maintaining only 15% of the land area of a watershed in
wetlands can reduce flooding peaks by as much as 60%. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC
BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22; see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS OVERVIEW,
supra note 30; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), OFFICE OF WATER, EPA843-F-06-001, WET-
LANDS: PROTECTING LIFE AND PROPERTY FROM FLOODING (May 2006), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/Flooding.pdf; Douglas R. Williams & Kim Diana
Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An Overview, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDER-
STANDING SECTION 404 2 (Connolly et al. eds., 2005). Flood damages in the U.S. average $2
billion each year and have become more costly since over half of the wetlands in the United
States have been drained or filled. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WET-
LANDS, supra note 22.
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floods.59 After peak flood flows have passed, wetlands slowly release
the stored waters, minimizing the impact on downstream prop-
erty.60 This slow release also allows coastal wetlands to preserve
shorelines by minimizing erosion.' In the Gulf Coast area, for ex-
ample, barrier islands, shoals, marshes, forested wetlands, and
other features of the coastal landscape provide a significant and
potentially sustainable buffer from wind wave action and storm
62surge generated by tropical storms and hurricanes. Indeed, the
damage sustained during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 would have
been far less severe had it not been for the significant loss of wet-
lands along the coast and Mississippi delta. 63 Preserving wetlands,
in conjunction with other flood control measures, offers a degree
of protection against flooding that is often more effective and less
costly than a system of traditional dikes and levees. 4
"A wetland's natural filtration process can remove excess nutri-
ents before water leaves a wetland, making it healthier for
drinking, swimming, and supporting plants and animals."65 The
most important factor for the health and function of wetlands is
water movement. 66 "When water enters a wetland, it slows down
and moves around wetland plants. Much of the suspended sedi-
ment drops out and settles to the wetland floor. Plant roots and
microorganisms on plant stems and in the soil absorb excess nutri-
ents in the water from fertilizers, manure, leaking septic tanks, and
municipal sewage."67
Finally, wetlands, like forests, provide a substantial carbon sink
that can help mitigate the impact of climate change.68 Wetlands are
much better than forests for storing carbon, however, because





64. DONALD L. HEY ET AL., THE WETLANDS INITIATIVE, FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION IN
THE UPPER Mississippi RIVER BASIN: AN ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE 1-5 (2004).
65. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22. The
Congaree Bottomland Hardwood Swamp in South Carolina removes a quantity of pollutants




68. As the EPA explains, carbon sinks are "[clarbon reservoirs and conditions that
take-in and store more carbon (i.e., carbon sequestration) than they release. Carbon sinks
can serve to partially offset greenhouse gas emissions. Forests and oceans are large carbon
sinks." Environmental Protection Agency, Glossary of Climate Change Terms,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/Glossary.html#Carbon-sinks
(last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
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unlike forests they can last for hundreds and even thousands of
69
years.
According to a 1997 assessment of all wetlands worldwide, the
economic value of the range of services wetlands provide is ap-
proximately $14.9 trillion. 70 That said, the difficulty of quantifying
aesthetic value means that the true worth of wetlands is impossible
to measure accurately. Still, as the EPA notes, "[b]y nearly any
measure used, it pays to save wetlands."
7'
II. WETLANDS IN THE UNITED STATES
Wetlands can be found in every county and climatic zone in the
United States. 2 Nearly seventy-five percent of the nation's wetlands
in the lower forty-eight states are privately owned.73 Historians es-
timate that wetlands in Colonial times comprised about 221 million
acres of the lower forty-eight states. Another 170 million acres
were found in Alaska, comprising approximately forty-five percent
of the state's total surface area,75 and Hawaii originally contained
an estimated 59,000 acres of wetlands. 76 A spectacular variety of
wetland types exist throughout the United States, ranging from
permafrost underlain wetlands in Alaska to tropical rain forests in
Hawaii to riparian wetlands in the arid Southwest. This Part briefly
describes the history of American wetlands policy in order to pro-
vide context for the current debate over wetlands regulation.
69. See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Wetlands Information,
http://www.iisd.org/wetlands/info.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2006). But see Energy Informa-
tion Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1996,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg97rpt/chap7.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (sug-
gesting that wetlands are a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions). The exact
degree to which wetlands will mitigate the impact of climate change remains to be seen. See
Chester, supra note 29 (noting that "how the bog stores carbon, in what quantity and how
that storage capacity will change with changes in the climate is completely unknown"); Asso-
ciation of State Wetland Managers, Inc., Symposium 43: Carbon Balance of Peatlands,
http://aswm.org/science/carbon/quebec/sym43.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (noting
many uncertainties in the magnitude and the direction of potential changes in carbon dy-
namics of northern peatlands based on climate change).
70. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WETLANDS, supra note 22.
71. Id.
72. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS OVERVIEW, supra note 30.
73. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THREATS TO WETLANDS, supra note 36.
74. DAHL, supra note 42, at 1. As reported in a study spanning several centuries, Flor-
ida, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Texas were the four states with the greatest wetland acreage.
Id. at 5. Additional states with extensive wetlands included Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Michi-
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Even though the United States is in large part composed of wet-
lands, Americans have not always understood or appreciated their
important ecological role. From the time of the earliest European
settlements in the United States, settlers viewed wetlands primarily
as an obstacle to productive land use. 7 In 1763, George Washing-
ton established a company to drain the Great Dismal Swamp of
Virginia and North Carolina.8 Over the 200 year period between
the 1780s and 1980s, the lower forty-eight states lost an estimated
fifty-three percent of their original acreage of wetlands-a startling
average of sixty acres of wetlands lost every hour over 200 years.79
While the rate of wetlands loss has declined dramatically since the
1980s, our nation's wetlands remain imperiled.80 Nonetheless, the
growing recognition of the importance of wetlands to our quality
of life and the ecological health of the planet has increasingly led
to bipartisan support for policies that promote wetlands preserva-
tion and restoration. For example, in 1989, the first President Bush
established a national goal of "no net loss of wetlands."' This pol-
icy was reaffirmed by President George W. Bush in 2002 and again
on Earth Day, 2004, when he challenged the nation to increase the
quantity as well as quality of these important resources. 80 Still, crit-
ics of the government's efforts have raised doubts about the
sincerity of these policies, and much remains to be accomplished.3
77. Id.
78. Selcraig, supra note 30, at 46.
79. DAHL, supra note 42, at 1. California has lost the largest percentage of original wet-
lands within the state: a full ninety-one percent. Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center,
Wetlands: Losses in the United States, 1780's to 1980's, Executive Summary,
http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/wetlands/wetloss/summary.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2007). Florida has lost the most acreage: 9.3 million acres. Id. Alaska stands alone as the only
state where wetland resources have not been substantially reduced, having lost "a fraction of
one percent" of its wetlands. Id. "The states of Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
have lost the fewest wetland acres overall, 7,000, 20,000 and 38,000 acres respectively." Id.
Hawaii has lost an estimated twelve percent of its original wetland areas. Id.; see also Williams
& Connolly, supra note 58, at 2.
80. A year 2000 Fish and Wildlife Service report documenting changes in wetlands
status that occurred between 1986 and 1997 indicated the annual loss rate was 58,500 acres,
an eighty percent reduction in the average annual rate of wetland loss. T.E. DAHL, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN
THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1998 TO 2004, at 15 (2005) [hereinafter DAHL, STATUS
AND TRENDS]. Data collected for this report shows that for the first time net wetland gains,
acquired through wetland restoration and creation activities, outpaced net wetland losses,
with a net gain of 191,750 wetland acres nationwide, or an average annual net gain of 32,000
acres. Id. at 95.
81. See Compensating for Wetland Losses Under the Clean Water Act 2 (Nat'l Acad-
emies Press, 2001).
82. DAHL, STATUS AND TRENDS supra note 80, at 19.
83. See, e.g., Press Release, Ass'n of State Wetlands Managers, Ponds Proliferate, But
Wetland Losses Continue (March 30, 2006), available at http://www.aswm.org/fwp/
pressrelease2006.htm ("The 'no net loss of wetlands' is largely due to the proliferation of
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III. HISTORY OF SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Federal authority to regulate commercial activities on our Na-
tion's waterways has deep roots."4 This Part describes the history of
federal regulation of waterways as it pertains to wetlands develop-
ment.
In its seminal decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court
described the federal power to regulate commerce, including navi-
gation, as "one of the primary objects for which the people of
America adopted their government.. .. 5Further, an early federal
statute, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act ("RHA") of
1899, focused on activities that might obstruct navigation. 6 Section
10 of the RHA prohibited excavating or filling in navigable waters
without authorization from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.87
Section 13 of the RHA, commonly known as the Refuse Act, was
the precursor to our modern pollution control laws and prohibited
the discharge of refuse into any "navigable water" or its tributaries, as
well as the deposit of refuse on the bank of a navigable water
"whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed" with-
out first obtaining a permit from the Corps.88
ponds, lakes and other 'deepwater habitats' .... These ponds include ornamental lakes for
residential developments, stormwater detention ponds, wastewater treatment lagoons, aqua-
culture ponds and golf course water hazards."); see alsOJULIE M. SIBBING, NAT'L WILDLIFE
FOUND., NOWHERE NEAR No-NET-Loss, available at http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/
NowhereNearNoNetLoss.pdf.
84. See Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy and the
Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REv. 873, 877 (1993); see also Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 176
(2001) (Stevens,J, dissenting).
85. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). As the Court stated:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-
scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The
mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which
shall exclude all laws concerning navigation .... All America understands, and has
uniformly understood, the word "commerce," to comprehend navigation .... The
power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for
which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been con-
templated in forming it.
Id. at 189-90.
86. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000); seeJOsEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RE-
SOURCEs 639 (4th ed. 2006).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000); see also Williams & Connolly, supra note 58, at 4.
88. See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000) (emphasis added); see also U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
Regulatory Program Overview, http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/oceover.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2006).
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As the nation matured, the focus of federal regulatory power
over water gradually shifted from navigation to pollution control."9
In addition to Section 13 of the RHA, Congress passed the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") in 1948, which took mod-
est steps toward establishing a regulatory program. ° It authorized
the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service to work with
federal, state, and local authorities to develop programs to reduce
or eliminate pollution of "interstate waters and their tributaries," and
it declared "pollution ... which endangers the health or welfare of
persons in a State other than that in which the discharge originates
... to be a public nuisance. " 91
The RHA also took on more of a pollution control focus. In
1960, the Supreme Court upheld the government's claim that in-
dustrial deposits in a navigable waterway that reduced the depth of
the channel were a prohibited "obstruction" to the navigable ca-
pacity of the river within the meaning of section 10 of the RHA. 2
This generous judicial interpretation of the RHA favored broad
federal powers.
Finally, the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in 1970 made environmental protection part of the man-
date of every federal agency.93 In Zabel v. Tabb, the Court of Appeals
89. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 178 (citing Kalen, supra note 84, at 877-79 & n. 30) ("During
the middle of the 20th century, the goals of federal water regulation began to shift away
from an exclusive focus on protecting navigability and toward a concern for preventing
environmental degradation.").
90. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, Pub. L. No. 845, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948).
91. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Stevens also noted in a footnote in his SWANCC dis-
sent:
The FWPCA of 1948 applied only to "interstate waters." Subsequently, it was harmo-
nized with the [RIIA] such that-like the earlier statute-the FWPCA defined its
jurisdiction with reference to "navigable waters." None of these early versions of the
FWPCA could fairly be described as establishing a comprehensive approach to the
[pollution] problem, but they did contain within themselves several of the elements
that would later be employed in the CWA [Clean Water Act].
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 178, n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). See gener-
ally Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water
Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFM. L. REv. 527
(2005) (describing history of federal water pollution legislation).
92. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 489 (1960). In his dissent in
SWANCC, Justice Stevens cited Republic Steel Corp. as an example of the "awakening of inter-
est in the use of federal power [under the Commerce Clause] to protect the aquatic
environment ... [by] reinterpret[ing] § 13 of the RHA ... to apply ... to industrial dis-
charges into navigable waters, even when such discharges did nothing to impede
navigability." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see alsoWilliams & Connoll); supra note 58, at 5.
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for the Fifth Circuit cited NEPA in expressing "no doubt that the
[Corps] can refuse on conservation grounds to grant a permit un-
der the [RHA] ."
The modern era of federal water pollution control began with
the adoption of comprehensive amendments to the FWPCA in
1972, which had the ambitious and ultimately unsuccessful goal of
eliminating the discharge of all pollutants into the navigable waters
by 1985. 95 Congress amended and renamed the FWPCA as the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") in 197796 and significantly amended it
again in 1987.97 Notwithstanding these changes, today the basic
structure of the 1972 law remains intact. The Act's primary pur-
pose is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters." ' The law also directs
federal agencies to give "due regard" "to the improvements which
are necessary to conserve such waters for the protection and
propagation of fish and aquatic life and wildlife [and] recreational
"€99
purposes ....
The CWA establishes two distinct permit programs: one oper-
ated by the EPA, and one operated by the Corps. First, section 402
establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), which prohibits the point source discharge of pollutants
(other than dredged or fill material) into "navigable waters" with-
out a permit issued or approved by the EPA.0 ° Second, section 404
prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable
waters" without a permit from the Corps. 01 However, unlike sec-
tion 13 of the RHA, which focused on the maintenance of
navigability, section 404's principal purpose is pollution control. 2
94. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 214 (5th Cir. 1970).
95. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 92 Pub. L. No. 500,
86 Stat. 817, amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
96. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. § 1251).
97. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1251).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
99. Id. § 1252(a).
100. Id. § 1342.
101. Id. § 1344. Selection of such sites must be in accordance with guidelines developed
by the EPA in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army; these guidelines are known as the
"404(b) (1) Guidelines." 40 C.F.R. § 230.1 (2006).
102. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159, 179 (2001) (Stevens,J., dissenting). Earlier in his dissent,Justice Stevens stated
that because § 13 of the RHA "assigned to the [Corps] the mission of regulating discharges
into certain waters in order to protect their use as highways for the transportation of inter-
state and foreign commerce ... the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under the RHA
accordingly extended only to waters that were 'navigable.'" Id. at 175. In contrast, Stevens
noted, "[tihe activities regulated by the CWA have nothing to do with Congress' 'commerce
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Thus, although Congress opted to carry over the traditional juris-
dictional term "navigable waters" from the RHA and early
iterations of the FWPCA, it defined that term for all purposes un-
der the 1972 Act to encompass all "waters of the United States.
'"1 03
As described more fully below,1 4 the legislative history suggests that
this definition was intended to be construed broadly-arguably to
the full extent of the government's constitutional power.
1
05
In part because the RHA defined "navigable waters" narrowly,
the CWA's use of the same term to describe an ostensibly broader
category of waters has created much contention and confusion.
Whether Section 404 authorizes the Corps to regulate isolated wa-
ter bodies and wetlands that lack a direct connection to navigable
waters has been a particular source of controversy.
A. The Corps and EPA Rulemaking Actions
The Corps promulgated its first rule interpreting its jurisdiction
over the "navigable waters of the United States" in 1972, immedi-
ately after the FWPCA amendments were enacted. 116 The 1972 rule
defined "navigable waters of the United States" as "those waters
which are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the fu-
ture susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign
commerce."'07 Although the Corps later described this definition as
"assert[ing] regulatory authority over many heretofore unregu-
power over navigation.' Indeed, the goals of the 1972 statute have nothing to do with naviga-
tion at all." Id. at 181.
103. "Navigable waters" is defined in the statute as "the waters of the United States, in-
cluding the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). The statutory and regulatory
definitions of "waters of the United States" apply not only to section 404 but throughout the
Act. See id. § 1311 (general prohibition against discharging pollutants into waters without a
permit); id. § 1313 (water quality standards and total maximum daily loads); id. § 1321 (oil
spill liability prevention and liability provisions); id. § 1342 (the CWA's other major permit-
ting program, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System); see also Brief of the
U.S. Gov't at 20, United States v. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (No. 04-1034) (asserting
that the term "waters of the United States" "defines the scope of regulatory jurisdiction to be
exercised under other provisions of the CWA"); Mark A. Chertok & Kate Sinding, Federal
Jurisdiction Over Wetlands: "Waters of the United States," in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDER-
STANDING SECTION 404 2 (Connolly et al. eds., 2005).
104. See infra Part IV.B.
105. See S. REP. No. 92-1236 (1972) (Conf. Rep.); see also Regulatory Program of the
Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,127 (July 19, 1977).
106. Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 33 C.ER. § 209.260(c) (1973).
107. Id. As an interpretative rule of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
Corps of Engineers, this amendment was promulgated without publication of a notice of
proposed rule making. Id. It superseded the definition located in 33 C.F.R. § 209.260. Id.
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lated waterways, "'" it still limited section 404 to "only waters en-
cumbered by the Federal navigation servitude (i.e., the navigable
waters of the United States)."' 0 When it established its section 404
permitting program in 1974, the Corps again interpreted its juris-
diction over the "waters of the United States" to mean
authorization of regulation of the full scope of the traditional navi-
gable waters.'10 In the preamble to the 1974 rule, the Corps stated:
Section 404 of the FWPCA uses the term "navigable waters"
which is later defined in the Act as "the waters of the United
States." The Conference Report, in discussing this term, ad-
vises that this term is to be given the "broadest possible
Constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency de-
terminations which have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes." We feel that the guidance in inter-
preting the meaning of this term which has been offered by
this Conference Report-to give it the broadest possible Con-
stitutional interpretation-is the same as the basic premise
from which the aforementioned judicial precedents [inter-
preting the "navigable waters of the United States"] have
evolved. The extent of Federal regulatory jurisdiction must be
limited to that which is Constitutionally permissible, and in
this regard, we feel that we must adopt an administrative defi-
nition of this term which is soundly based on this premise and
the judicial precedents which have reinforced it. Accordingly,
we feel that in the administration of this regulatory program
both terms should be treated synonymously."'
108. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115
(Apr. 3, 1974).
109. Navigable Waters Procedures and Guidelines for Disposal of Dredged or Fill Mate-
rial, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,766 (May 6, 1975) (emphasis added).
110. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. at 12,115.
As one commentator explained:
The Corps ... rejected EPA's broad interpretation. Instead, the Corps viewed the
CWA as requiring it to assert jurisdiction over all the traditional navigable waters, in-
cluding those traditional navigable waters that it had previously declined to regulate
.... [T]his interpretation makes sense in light of the historical context. Congress
had repeatedly urged the Corps to discard earlier, limited interpretations of its juris-
diction and to expand its interpretation of its authority to include the full extent of
the "traditional navigable waters."
Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New Look at the
Legislative History of the Clean WaterAct, 32 ENrVTL. L. REP. 11042, 11050 (2002).
111. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. at 12,115.
The Corps defined "navigable waters" to include "those waters of the United States which
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The Corps further explained which criteria would qualify a wa-
ter body as "navigable," including "past, present, or potential
presence of interstate or foreign commerce" and "physical capa-
bilities for use by commerce.... The Corps emphasized that "[iut is
the water body's capability of use by the public for purposes of




As to wetlands, the 1974 rule states that:
Unless the public interest requires otherwise, no permit shall
be granted for work in wetlands identified as important ...
unless the District Engineer concludes, on the basis of the
analysis required in [33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f)], that the benefits
of the proposed alteration outweigh the damage to the wet-
lands resource and the proposed alteration in necessary to
realize those benefits."
4
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council challenged the Corps' regulatory
definition of "waters of the United States." 15 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia issued an order finding that
are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or
may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce." 33
C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1975).
112. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(d).
113. 33 C.ER. § 209.260(e)(1).
114. 33 C.ER. §209 .120(g)(3)(iv). In 33 C.F.R. §209. 120(g)(3)(ii), the rule defines
wetlands considered to perform functions important to the public interest as:
(a) wetlands which serve important natural biological functions, including
food chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing
and resting sites for aquatic or land species;
(b) wetlands set aside for study of the aquatic environment or as sanctuaries
or refuges;
(c) wetlands contiguous to areas listed in paragraph (g) (3) (ii) (a) and (b)
of this section, the destruction or alteration of which would affect det-
rimentally the natural drainage characteristics, sedimentation patterns,
salinity distribution, flushing characteristics, current patterns, or other
environmental characteristics of the above areas;
(d) wetlands which are significant in shielding other areas from wave ac-
tion, erosion, or storm damage. Such wetlands often include barrier
beaches, islands, reefs and bars;
(e) wetlands which serve as valuable storage areas for storm and flood
waters; and
(f) wetlands which are prime natural recharge areas. Prime recharge areas
are locations where surface and ground water are directly intercon-
nected.
Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. at 12,121.
115. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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Congress had "asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters
to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution. '' 6 "Accordingly," the court declared, "as used
in the Water Act, the term ["navigable waters"] is not limited to the
traditional tests of navigability."' 7 The court ordered the Corps to
develop regulations "clearly recognizing the regulatory mandate of
the Water Act."" 8
In response to Callaway, the Corps proposed new regulations in
May 1975 intended to clarify the bounds of its jurisdiction."9 After
receiving public comments, the Corps promulgated interim final
regulations in July of 1975.120 These regulations extended federal
jurisdiction to most linear water bodies below the headwaters.
2
1
116. Id. at 686.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,766
(May 6, 1975).
120. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320
(July 25, 1975). The final rule was intended to be published after a 90-day period for public
comment on the interim final rule; however, the final rule was not published for another
two years. See Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19,
1977).
121. "Headwaters" is defined as:
[T]he point on the stream above which the flow is normally less than 5 cubic feet per
second; provided, however, the volume of flow, point and nonpoint source discharge
characteristics of the watershed, and other factors that may impact on the water qual-
ity of waters of the United States will be considered in determining this upstream
limit.
Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. at 31,325 (as codi-
fied in 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (2) (ii) (d)).
"Navigable waters" is defined as including coastal waters and wetlands; navigable rivers,
lakes, and streams; artificial channels and canals connected to navigable waters; wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters; and:
(c) Rivers, lakes, streams, and artificial water bodies that are navigable wa-
ters of the United States up to their headwaters and landward to their
ordinary high water mark;
(e) All tributaries of navigable waters of the United States up to their
headwaters and landward to their ordinary high water mark;
(f) Interstate waters landward to their ordinary high water mark and up to
their headwaters;
(g) Intrastate lakes, rivers and streams landward to their ordinary high wa-
ter mark and up to their headwaters that are utilized:
(1) By interstate travelers for water-related recreational purposes;
(2) For the removal of fish that are sold in interstate commerce;
(3) For industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce; or
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They also provided for a phase-in period, whereby the Corps would
gradually assert jurisdiction over waters upstream of the traditional
navigable waters.
22
The Corps issued final rules, largely confirming the 1975 interim
final rules, in July of 1977.123 The Corps defined "waters of the
(4) In the production of agricultural commodities sold or trans-
ported in interstate commerce;
(i) Those other waters which the District Engineer determines necessitate
regulation for the protection of water quality .... For example, in the
case of intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands
that are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters identified in
paragraphs (a)-(h), a decision on jurisdiction shall be made by the Dis-
trict Engineer.
Id. at 31,324-25 (as codified in 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (2)).
122. The Corps announced that:
Department of the Army permits will be required for the discharge of dredged mate-
rial or of fill material into navigable waters in accordance with the following phased
schedule:
(a) Phase I: After the effective date of this regulation, discharges of dredged
material or of fill material into coastal waters and coastal wetlands con-
tiguous or adjacent thereto or into inland navigable waters of the
United States and freshwater wetlands contiguous or adjacent thereto
are subject to the procedures of this regulation.
(b) Phase II: AfterJuly 1, 1976, discharges of dredged material or of fill ma-
terial into primary tributaries, freshwater wetlands contiguous or
adjacent to primary tributaries, and lakes are subject to the procedures
of this regulation.
(c) Phase Il After July 1, 1977, discharges of dredged material or fill mate-
rial into any navigable water are subject to the procedures of this
regulation.
Id. at 31,326 (as codified in 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e) (2) (i)).
123. Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,122. "Waters of
the United States" was defined as:
(1) The territorial seas ....
(2) Coastal and inland waters, lakes, rivers, and streams that are navigable
waters of the United States, including adjacent wetlands;
(3) Tributaries to navigable waters of the United States, including adjacent
wetlands (manmade nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated
on dry land are not considered waters of the United States under this
definition);
(4) Interstate waters and their tributaries including adjacent wetlands; and
(5) All other waters of the United States not identified in paragraphs (1)-
(4) above, such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams,
prairie potholes, and other waters that are not part of a tributary system
to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the United States, the deg-
radation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce.
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United States" to include "isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent
streams, prairie potholes, and other waters that are not part of a
tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the
United States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate commerce." 12 4 The 1977 final regulations exempted areas
above the headwaters from the section 404 permit requirement.
The Corps thus established by rule that discharges into "non-tidal
rivers, streams and their impoundments, including adjacent wet-
lands that are located above the headwaters," were permitted.' 25 In
practical effect, the 1975 and 1977 regulations were similar. The
Corps would require permits for dredge or fill activities in the tra-
ditional navigable waters, in non-navigable tributaries, and
adjacent wetlands, but not above the headwaters. This scheme sat-
isfied the order handed down in Callaway; in 1985, the Supreme
Court upheld the Corps' determination that wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters were subject to section 404 jurisdiction.
26
Just under a year later, in an attempt to "clarify the scope" of the
section 404 permit program, the Corps published the so-called "mi-
gratory bird rule," which expressly included within the definition
of "waters of the United States" those waters which are or could be
used by migratory bird species.2 The Corps stated in the regula-
tory preamble that it was responding to many concerns expressed
Id. at 37,144.
124. Id. at 37,144.
125. Id. at 37,146.
126. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). The
Court concluded in part that the definition of "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States" signaled Congress's intent to provide a more expansive jurisdiction under Section
404 than is provided by the Corps' jurisdiction over activities in "navigable waters" under the
RHA. Id. The Riverside Bayview Court agreed with the Corps' view that waters and adjacent
wetlands "together form the entire aquatic system." Id. The Corps' regulatory definition of
"wetlands" is set forth at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (2007):
Oncea site is properly characterized as a wetland, the Corps' regulations regard it as
within the 'waters of the United States' in three circumstances: (1) the wetland is an
interstate wetland, (2) the wetland is adjacent to other waters of the United States, or
(3) the use, degradation, or destruction of the wetland could affect interstate com-
merce.
Chertok & Sinding, supra note 103, at 65. See 33 C.F.R. 323.2(d) for the Corps' definition of
"adjacent," a term that "has been construed generously by the courts." Id. at 66. "Some
courts have held that wetlands may be regulated as 'adjacent' when groundwater aquifers
provide hydrologic connections between the wetlands and other surface waters." Id. "Other
courts have also found that adjacency may be demonstrated by an ecological relationship
rather than a direct physical connection." Id. "Absent contiguity or an ecological relation-
ship to other waters of the United States, a wetland is generally considered to be 'isolated'
rather than adjacent." Id. at 67.
127. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
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by both the public and the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory
Relief, and not making any changes to existing definitions. 128 The
Corps emphasized that it was neither trying to "reduce" nor "ex-
pand" the scope of jurisdiction, but merely to "clarify ... by
defining the terms in accordance with the way the program is pres-
ently being conducted.' 29 The preamble also described what the
Corps and the EPA deemed to be "waters of the United States"'2 °
and what they did not.13 ' The Corps also stated that it planned to
"propose a complete revision of Part 329 [definition of Navigable
Waters of the United States], in the near future, to simplify and
clarify the procedures involved, while retaining the essential as-
pects of the relevant policy, , 3 2 but it never followed through on
that commitment.
3
128. Id. at 41,210, 41,216.
129. Id. at 41,217.
130. Id. The term "waters of the United States" extends to intrastate waters:
(a) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory
Bird Treaties; or
(b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines; or
(c) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
(d) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
Id.
131. Id. The Corps described those waters generally not considered "waters of the United
States," reserving the fight for either the Corps or the EPA, however, on a case-by-case basis, to
determine otherwise. Those waters generally outside the scope of § 404 include:
(a) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry land.
(b) Artificially irrigated areas which would revert to upland if the irrigation
ceased.
(c) Artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating and/or diking dry land
to collect and retain water and which are used exclusively for such pur-
poses as stock watering, irrigation, settling basins, or rice growing.
(d) Artificial reflecting or swimming pools or other small ornamental bod-
ies of water created by excavating and/or diking dry land to retain
water for primarily aesthetic reasons.
(e) Waterfilled depressions created in dry land incidental to construction
activity and pits excavated in dry land for the purpose of obtaining fill,
sand, or gravel unless and until the construction or excavation opera-
tion is abandoned and the resulting body of water meets the definition
of waters of the United States (see 33 C.ER. 328.3(a)).
Id.
132. Id.
133. The next clarification of the term "navigable waters" came from the Supreme
Court, not from the promised Corps rulemaking. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171-72 (2001).
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In 2001, the Supreme Court held in SWANCC that the Corps
could not assert jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-navigable
waters solely on the basis of the migratory bird rule.3 4 In response
to this decision, the Corps and the EPA published an Advance No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking on the regulatory definition of the
scope of the waters subject to jurisdiction under the CWA in
2003. s5 Part of the reason for the proposed rulemaking was con-
cern over whether CWA jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-
navigable waters could continue to be predicated on the other fac-
tors listed in the migratory bird rule.13 6 In addition, the agencies
were concerned that SWANCC might change the scope of regula-
tory jurisdiction under other provisions of the CWA, including
programs under sections 303, 311, 401, and 402, since jurisdiction
under these sections was also defined as over "the waters of the
United States." 37 Once again, however, the agencies never issued a
final rule.38 Instead, the Corps continued to interpret their juris-
diction under section 404 as reflected in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). 9
134. Id.
135. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [ANPRM] on the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003). As
described in a 2004 GAO Report:
The ANPRM generated significant interest, as evidenced by the approximately
133,000 comments submitted by state agencies, national development organizations,
environmental groups, and other parties. According to EPA, 99 percent of the com-
ments on the need for a new rule submitted to EPA and the Corps in response to the
ANPRM were opposed to a new rule. Some groups, such as industry representatives,
generally indicated that they favor a rulemaking because they believe the SWANCC
decision created, among other things, a great deal of uncertainty, resulting in un-
equal treatment and significant financial burden to the regulated community .... In
contrast, other groups, such as environmentalists, indicated a general opposition to
any rulemaking effort, expressing concerns that a new rule would result in reduced
federal jurisdiction under § 404 and other programs under the Clean Water Act ....
An EPA official stated that 41 of the 43 states that submitted comments were con-
cerned about any major reduction in Clean Water Act jurisdiction. This official also
said that most states are concerned that political, legal, and budgetary constraints
complicate efforts to regulate certain types of waters and wetlands at the state level.
GAO-04-297, supra note 11, at 14.
136. See51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217.
137. See sources cited supra note 103.
138. This failure to issue a final rule and thus clarify matters was recently lamented by
Justice Roberts in his concurrence in Rapanos. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208,
2235-36 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
139. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006) provides:
For the purpose of this regulation these terms are defined as follows:
(a) The term "waters of the United States" means
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B. Application of the Standards in the Field
To understand wetlands regulation under section 404 of the
CWA, it is important to understand not only the meaning of the
rules, but also the application of those rules in the field. The
Corps' Wetlands Delineation Manual is the chief guidance docu-
ment for determining the existence of wetlands at a project site."'
This guidance, which is mandatory, was first published in 1987 and
has since been augmented by regional supplements.14 ' In 1989, the
Corps, the EPA, the Fish & Wildlife Service, and the Soil Conserva-
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, in-
cluding all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (includ-
ing intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the
use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate
or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign trav-
elers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose
by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4)
of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are them-
selves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(6) of this
section;
(8) Waters of the United States do not include prior converted crop-
land. Notwithstanding the determination of an area's status as
prior converted cropland by any other Federal agency, for the
purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding
Clean Water Actjurisdiction remains with EPA.
Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the
requirements of CWA (other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m)
which also meet the criteria of this definition) are not waters of the United States.
Id.
140. See ENVTL. LAB., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, WETLANDS RESEARCH PROGRAM
TECHNICAL REPORT Y-87-1, WETLANDS DELINEATION MANUAL (1987), available at
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cache/papers/cs/28904/http:zSzzSzwww.wes.army.milzSzelzSzwe
tlandszSzpdfszSzwlman87.pdf/wetlands-research-program-technical.pdf.
141. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DRAFT REGIONAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE
CORPS OF ENG'RS WETLAND DELINEATION MANUAL: ARID WEST REGION (2005), available at
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/cw/cecwo/reg/Arid%20West%20draft.pdf.
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tion Service prepared an Interagency Wetlands Delineation Man-
ual in response to criticism that federal agencies were using
different procedures to identify jurisdictional wetlands. 4 2 But crit-
ics of the 1989 Manual claimed that it expanded regulatory
jurisdiction without giving the public a chance to comment. 43 The
criticism led to a 1991 proposal for a further revision of the Man-
ual, but these revisions also met strong opposition.' 44 Ultimately,
the Corps and the EPA decided to revert to the 1987 Manual, and
they continue to rely on it today.
45
The 1987 Manual requires that wetlands determinations be
made based upon "positive evidence of hydrophytic vegetation,
hydric soils, and wetland hydrology."4 6 Generally, all three of these
indicators must be present for the area to be delineated as a wet-
land, though limited exceptions apply in specific situations, such as
prairie potholes during drought years.'4 7 The purpose of the Man-
ual is not to classify a given wetland by type, but merely to
determine whether it is a wetland for purposes of section 404.
4
8
Once wetlands or other waters are found to exist at the project
site, Corps field inspectors and project managers make an initial
jurisdictional determination as to whether they constitute "waters
of the United States" and thus require a section 404 permit. "'9The
Corps considers over 80,000 applications for section 404 permits
each year and approves nearly all of them.' 50 Using the general
142. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVTL. POLICY, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A





146. ENVTL. LAB., supra note 140, at v.
147. Id. at 94. As the Corps explains, "[t]here are certain wetland types and/or condi-
tions that may make application of indicators of one or more parameters difficult, at least at
certain times of the year. These are not considered to be atypical situations. Instead, they are
wetland types in which wetland indicators of one or more parameters may be periodically
lacking due to normal seasonal or annual variations in environmental conditions that result
from causes other than human activities or catastrophic natural events." Id. (emphasis in
original). The Corps gives several "representative examples" of these types of wetlands which
may not meet the three criteria (hydrophytic vegetation, hydric soils, and wetland hydrol-
ogy), including seasonal wetlands, prairie potholes, and vegetated flats. Id.
148. Id. at 17. Although the Manual was "prepared primarily for use by Corps of Engi-
neers field inspectors," it is also used by consultants hired by developers who may need to
apply for a section 404 permit. Id.; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-
870, "WATERS AND WETLANDS: CORPS OF ENGINEERS NEEDS TO BETI'ER SUPPORT ITS DECI-
SIONS FOR NOT ASSERTING JURISDICTION" 4 (2005) [hereinafter GAO-05-870] (describing
process for applying for § 404 permit).
149. GAO-04-297, supra note 11, at 7.
150. See Williams & Connolly, supra note 58, at 13. According to the GAO, of 85,445
§ 404 applications received in fiscal year 2002, the Corps denied 128 applications; another
4143 were withdrawn. GAO-04-297, supra note 11, at 7.
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permit standards of section 404(e), the Corps approves nearly
ninety percent of the applications received. 5' The Corps approves
the remaining ten percent by individual permits, a process which
typically takes two to three months.1 52 The Corps district offices
process about 5500 alleged violations each year, usually for failing
to obtain a required permit.' 3 About ten percent of these are viola-
tions of section 10 of the RHA; seventy-five percent are violations
of section 404, and the remaining fifteen percent are violations of
both section 10 and section 404.'
5
Although the CWA's section 404 program remains the
centerpiece of the federal government's wetlands regulatory pro-
grams,1 55 the federal government also uses water quality
standards,' 6 watershed planning, 15 financial assistance,158 miti-
gation,19  monitoring and assessment,'16  and restoration
151. Williams & Connolly, supra note 58, at 18.
152. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 88, at 26. In emergencies, decisions can be
made in a matter of hours. Id. The decisions on individual permit applications that require
an individualized environmental impact statement ("EIS") average about three years to




155. CONNOLLY ET AL., WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING § 404 (Connolly
et al. eds., 2005). "At least thirty-six federal agencies have been involved in wetland-related
activities since 1990." Williams & Connolly, supra note 58, at 1. The federal government has
embraced a national goal of no overall net loss of the nation's wetland resources since 1988.
Id. On April 22, 2004-Earth Day-President Bush set the goal of moving beyond "no net
loss" of wetlands to attain an overall increase in the amount and quality of wetlands in Amer-
ica, announcing an objective to restore, protect, and improve at least three million acres of
wetlands over the next five years. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSERVING AMERICA'S
WETLANDS 2006: Two YEARS OF PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S GOAL 2 (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/wetlands_200604.pdf. According to this report,
1,797,000 acres of wetlands had been restored, created, protected, or improved by April
2006, including 588,000 acres of wetlands that did not exist in 2004, 563,000 acres of exist-
ing wetlands that were improved, and 646,000 acres of existing, high-quality wetlands that
were protected. Id.
156. See Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Water Quality and 401 Certifica-
tion, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/waterquality/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
157. See Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Wetlands and Watersheds,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact26.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
158. See Environmental Protection Agency Wetlands: State, Tribal and Local Initiatives,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/initiative/#financial (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
159. See Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Compensatory Mitigation,
http://www.epa.gov/wetlandsmitigation/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). Wetlands mitigation
banking-allowing property owners to restore or create a wetland to offset an action that
will destroy one-has gained popularity among agencies, utility companies, loggers, and
land developers, although biodiversity suffers with the increase of "created" wetlands be-
cause it is virtually impossible to inventory every living thing in order to know what you have
lost. Selcraig, supra note 30, at 44.
160. See Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands: Monitoring and Assessment,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/monitor/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
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efforts 16to protect wetlands. In addition, the wetlands conserva-
tion provision of the Food Security Act, 6 generally known as
"Swampbuster," has dramatically reduced the amount of wetlands
acreage converted for farming. 63 Swampbuster works essentially by
withholding federal farm program benefits from any person who
plants an agricultural commodity on a converted wetland that was
converted by drainage, dredging, leveling, or any other means af-
ter December 23, 1985.164 Swampbuster is supplemented by two
other provisions of the Food Security Act: the Conservation Re-
serve Program, which authorizes annual federal payments to
agricultural producers who remove highly erosion-prone cropland
from production,'65 and the Wetlands Reserve Program, which au-
thorizes the federal government to purchase conservation
easements on wetlands or enter into cost-share agreements to re-
store wetlands.' 66
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SCOPE OF SECTION 404
Section 404 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of dredge or fill
material into navigable waters without a permit. 67 The Supreme
Court has addressed the scope of section 404 on three occasions.
This Part argues that the Supreme Court has misconstrued Con-
gress's intent, and that only legislative reform can remedy the
problem that the Court has created.
161. See Environmental Protection Agency, River Corridor and Wetland Restoration,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/restore/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3824 (2000).
163. SeeJEFFREY ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RES. REPS., 96-35ENR, AGRICUL-
TURAL WETLANDS: CURRENT PROGRAMS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL (1996), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/wetlands/wet-4.cfm. Describing the combined
impact of the § 404 program and Swampbuster, the report notes:
The Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), citing data it gathers in the
Natural Resources Inventory every 5 years, calculates that the gross rate of [wetlands]
loss averaged about 135,000 acres on non-Federal lands annually between 1982 and
1992, with a net loss is [sic] 70,000 to 90,000 acres after all restoration and mitigation
activities are also considered. By 1992, the gross rate of conversions to agricultural
use had declined to 31,000 acres, while the net loss was about 20,000 acres.
Id.
164. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821(a)-(b).
165. See id. § 3831.
166. See id. § 3837.
167. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). Section 404 is described fully in Part III.
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A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
The Riverside case arose as a result of a plan by a developer, Riv-
erside Bayview Homes, to build a housing development on its 80-
acre tract of land about one mile from Lake St. Clair in southeast-
ern Michigan. 16 To accommodate the development, Riverside
began to fill the land. 69 The Corps sued Riverside to enjoin the
filling, claiming that the land contained wetlands adjacent to navi-
gable waters and that the developer was thus required to obtain a
section 404 permit before proceeding with its construction. 7 0 The
federal district court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled for
the Corps, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. 71 The appeals court con-
strued the Corps' rules narrowly to encompass only those wetlands
subject to flooding at a frequency that would support the growth of
aquatic vegetation. 2 The court chose this narrow reading because
of its concern that a broad construction of the Corp's authority
over wetlands might result in a taking of private property for a pub-
lic use without just compensation in contravention of the Fifth
Amendment.
7 3
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court described the is-
sues before it as "whether [Riverside's] property is an 'adjacent
wetland' within the meaning of the applicable regulation, and, if
so, whether the Corps' jurisdiction over 'navigable waters' gives it
statutory authority to regulate discharges of fill material into such a
wetland." 74 It was not impressed with the lower court's concern
about a possible "taking":
[W] e have made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regu-
latory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute
a regulatory taking. The reasons are obvious. A requirement
that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use
of his or her property does not itself "take" the property in
any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system im-
plies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner
free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the
permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to
168. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
169. See id. at 124.
170. See id.
171. The lower court found that the wetland located on Riverside's property was adja-
cent to Black Creek, a navigable waterway, which flows into Lake St. Clair. See id. at 121.
172. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 397-98 (6th Cir.
1984).
173. See id. at 398.
174. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 126.
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the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the
denial is to prevent "economically viable" use of the land in
question can it be said that a taking has occurred.
75
After addressing the Sixth Circuit's constitutional concerns, the
Court found the remaining questions relatively easy. Regarding the
scope of the Corps' rule, the Court found that it encompassed wet-
lands that were saturated by surface or groundwater, even if they
were never subject to flooding. As for the question of whether the
Corps' rules were supported by the language of the statute, the
Court first determined that review of the Corps' interpretation
should proceed under the deferential standard set forth in its Chev-
ron decision.76 In accordance with this standard, and after a
lengthy review of the merits of the Corps' conclusion "that wet-
lands adjacent to lakes, rivers, streams, and other bodies of water
may function as integral parts of the aquatic environment even
when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in
the adjacent bodies of water,"77 the Court found the Corps' rules to
be a reasonable interpretation of the statute:
We cannot say that the Corps' conclusion that adjacent wet-
lands are inseparably bound up with the "waters" of the
United States-based as it is on the Corps' and EPA's techni-
cal expertise-is unreasonable. In view of the breadth of
federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself
and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to
regulable waters, the Corps' ecological judgment about the
relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands
provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent
wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act.7 "
The Court also found a strong case for congressional acquies-
cence in the Corps' broad assertion of regulatory power. During
the debate over amendments to the Clean Water Act in 1977, crit-
ics of the Corps sought to limit its jurisdiction to waters that were
navigable in fact and those wetlands that were inundated by con-
tiguous navigable waters. After substantial debate on the very
question of the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction, Congress chose to
175. Id. at 126-27 (internal citations omitted).
176. See id. at 131; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
177. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135.
178. Id. at 134.
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retain the Corps' broad jurisdictional claim. 79 Even while acknowl-
edging some wariness in reading too much into Congress's failure
to act, the Court found that "a refusal by Congress to overrule an
agency's construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the
reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the admin-
istrative construction has been brought to Congress' attention
through legislation specifically designed to supplant it.
s180
179. The original House bill included the following provision: "The discharge of
dredged or fill material into non-navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to them is regulated
if the Secretary of the Army and the Governor of the State in which they are located agree
that their regulation is needed because of their ecological and environmental importance."
H.R. REP. No. 95-830, at 97-98 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, Vol. 3, at 281-82 (1978) (emphasis added). Although this
language did not survive the Senate's modifications to H.R. 3199 and ultimately did not end
up in the conference report, it does demonstrate that even those House members who
wanted to limit jurisdiction under the dredge and fill permit program would still have ex-
tended it to non-navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to them so long as the affected
state's Governor agreed the areas should be regulated.
Excerpts from the final debate in the House and Senate before passage of the 1977
Amendment include the following telling remarks:
Initially, the concern of people interested in protecting the wetlands was that the
definition for "navigable waters" might be tightened. The definition remains fundamen-
tally unchanged ....
123 CONG. REC. 30, 38,994 (1977) (statement of Rep. Ambro) (emphasis added).
One of the most controversial [issues] relates to the regulation of disposal of dredge
and fill material, resulting from ajudicial decision as to the authority and responsibil-
ity of the Army Corps of Engineers under section 404 of the 1972 Act. That decision
resulted in widespread concern that many activities usually considered routine would
be prohibited or made extremely difficult because of the complex regulatory proce-
dure set up by the Corps unless there was a new statement of congressional intent. I
believe H.R. 3199, in its present form, provides that clarification and necessary direc-
tion. It recognizes that there must be no basic gaps in the program for protection of
wetlands and waterways from contamination and thus provides a broad program of
control and required discharge permits.
Id. at 39,196 (statement of Sen. Randolph, Chairman of the Senate Comm. on Env't and
Pub. Works).
The conference bill retains the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation's waters
exercised in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act to control pollution to the
fullest constitutional extent.
Id. at 39,209 (statement of Sen. Baker).
180. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985).
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B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)
The SWANCC case 8' posed a more difficult question than River-
side. In SWANCC, the issue was whether the Solid Waste Agency
needed a section 404 permit to construct a landfill among isolated
intrastate ponds.' The Corps had initially concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over the site because it contained no wetlands, but it
reversed that decision on the basis of the so-called migratory bird
rule. According to the 1986 Corps' interpretation of its rules, sec-
tion 404 covered lands which are or would be used by migratory
birds that cross state lines or are protected by migratory bird trea-
ties.84 Speaking for a five-person majority, Justice Rehnquist found
that "the 'Migratory Bird Rule' was not fairly supported by the
CWA."8 5 The Court distinguished Riverside, noting that:
It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'naviga-
ble waters' that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside
Bayview Homes .... In order to rule for respondents here, we
would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends
to ponds that are not adjacent to open water. But we conclude
that the text of the statute will not allow this.'86
In a footnote, the majority referenced the legislative history of
the original Clean Water Act wherein Congress indicated that it
"intend[ed] that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation."1 7 Somewhat oddly, however,
and without further explanation, the majority stated that this
language did not "signif [y] that Congress intended to exert any-
thing more than its commerce power over navigation."'88 Yet, as the
Court had previously acknowledged in Riverside and as the
SWANCC majority itself admitted, "Congress intended the phrase
'navigable waters' to include 'at least some waters that would not
be deemed navigable under the classical understanding of that
181. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
182. Id. at 162.
183. Id. at 164.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 167. The majority included justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas,
as well as ChiefJustice Rehnquist. Id. at 161.
186. Id. at 167-68.
187. Id. at 168 n.3 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)).
188. Id.
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term.' "" Thus, Congress apparently did intend to exert something
more than its traditional commerce power over navigation. Indeed,
if one accepts the legislative history, Congress apparently intended
that the phrase "navigable waters" be construed as broadly as the
Commerce Clause itself would allow. '90
The majority also rejected the argument that had been success-
fully made in the Riverside case that the post-enactment legislative
history of the CWA showed congressional acquiescence in the
broad administrative interpretation of the law. Although acknowl-
edging that it had occasionally recognized congressional
acquiescence in administrative interpretations, it found the evi-
dence of such acquiescence wanting in this case, notwithstanding
its plain finding to the contrary in Riverside.'9'
Finally, the majority rejected the government's claim that its in-
terpretation of the law was entitled to deference under the Chevron
189. Id. at 171 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133
(1985)).
190. "The legislative history of the term 'navigable waters' specified that it 'be given the
broadest constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have
been made or may be made for administrative purposes.'" Regulatory Program of the Corps
of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,127 (July 19, 1977) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-1465, at 144);
see infra note 269 (statement made by Rep.John Dingell during the 1972 floor debate in the
House).
191. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170 ("We conclude that respondents have failed to make the
necessary showing that the failure of the 1977 House bill demonstrates Congress' acquies-
cence to the Corps' regulations or the 'Migratory Bird Rule."'). When the Corps
promulgated its final rule "revising and reorganizing all regulations governing the permit
programs of the Corps of Engineers" onJuly 19, 1977, it explicitly included isolated wetlands
as within its jurisdiction. Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144
(July 19, 1977). For the purpose of the regulation, the Corps defined "waters of the United
States" as, among other things, "[a]ll other waters of the United States ... such as isolated
wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams ... and other waters that are not part of a tributary
system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the United States, the degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate commerce." Id. In a footnote to this section of
the definition of waters of the United States, the Corps described this inclusion of isolated
wetlands, etc., as "incorporat[ing] all other waters of the United States that could be regu-
lated under the Federal government's Constitutional powers to regulate and protect
interstate commerce, including those for which the connection to interstate commerce may
not be readily obvious...." Id.
Five months later, during the final debate in the House on H.R. 3199, the bill's sponsor,
Representative Roberts, mentioned this very same July 19, 1977 regulation as part of the
source of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation's concern that the section 404
program would prove difficult to administer. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT OF 1977, Vol. 3, at 348 (1978). Thus, the Committee recommended a narrowing of
section 404 jurisdiction to "traditionally navigable waters." Id. However, the final version of
the bill that resulted from the Conference Report, described by Representative Roberts as a
"successful compromise," left the Corps' interpretation of its jurisdiction untouched. 123
CONG. REc. 38,951 (1977) (statement of Rep. Roberts). This bill became the 1977 Amend-
ment to the FWPCA.
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doctrine.9 2 The majority suggested that deference was not war-
ranted because the statute was clear, but that even if it were not
clear, deference would not be accorded to the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute because it sought to invoke "the outer limits of
Congress' power. ' 93
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
dissented. 19 4 Stevens began by tracing the history of the CWA. He
noted in particular that while section 404 had its roots in the RHA,
its purposes were fundamentally different. Whereas the focus of
the RHA was on obstructions to navigation, the CWA was intended
to control water pollution. According to the dissent, this shift in
purpose made it necessary to expand the scope of the law beyond
navigability. 5' Congress's intent to support such a shift was evi-
denced by the decision to delete the word "navigable" from the
definition of "navigable waters," as well as by the Conference Re-
port language that had been summarily rejected by the majority.
Indeed, the dissent suggested that despite the use of the phrase
"navigable waters," "[t]he activities regulated by the CWA have
nothing to do with Congress' 'commerce power over naviga-
tion.' 3,196
Stevens found a strong case for congressional acquiescence as
well as deference under Chevron. As Stevens noted, the Court had
already decided in Riverside that Congress had acquiesced to the
Corps' broad jurisdictional claims during the debates on the 1977
CWA amendments. 9 7 While the SWANCC case involved isolated wa-
ters-a resource whose connection to "navigable waters" was more
tenuous than the wetlands that were adjacent to navigable waters
in Riverside--these isolated waters were fully within the scope of
those waters that were the subject of congressional debate over sec-
tion 404's jurisdictional reach during the deliberations over
amendments to the Clean Water Act in 1977.'9' Moreover, although
the majority had focused its attention on the migratory bird rule
announced in 1986, Stevens noted that the isolated waters over
192. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
193. Id. The Court of Appeals found that the Migratory Bird Rule was plainly within the
scope of the Commerce Clause because millions of people spend more than a billion dollars
on recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds. Id. at 173. The government had further
argued that the protection of migratory birds is an important national interest. Id. The ma-
jority was at best skeptical of these claims, noting that "[t]hese arguments raise significant
constitutional questions." Id. at 173.
194. Id. at 174.
195. Id. at 179-80 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 181.
197. Id. at 185-91.
198. See supra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
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which the Corps' 1977 rules claimed jurisdiction might affect inter-
state commerce in any number of ways.' 99 Thus, the migratory bird
rule was merely intended as another example of how isolated wa-
ters might affect interstate commerce. It was not meant to supplant
the general rule that isolated waters should be covered whenever
they could affect interstate commerce, regardless of the way in
which such commerce might be affected °. °
Stevens also noted that the connection between migratory birds
and the isolated waters at issue in the SWANCC case was clear, as
was their impact on commerce. The waters were home to several
bird species protected by international treaties,20' and filling these
waters would adversely impact these species. °2 The presence of
these migratory birds, in turn, affected interstate commerce by
generating commercial activities, such as bird watching and hunt-
ing, of enormous economic value.20
C. Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
The facts in the Rapanos and Carabell cases24 were more similar
to those in Riverside than they were to SWANCC. Unlike SWANCC,
which involved isolated waters, the Rapanos and Carabell cases in-
volved wetlands that were adjacent to tributaries of navigable
199. The rules were intended to encompass "isolated lakes and wetlands, intermittent
streams, prairie potholes, and other waters not part of a tributary system to interstate waters
or to navigable waters of the United States, the degradation or destruction of which could
affect interstate commerce." Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg.
37,127 (July 19, 1977). The Corps went on to describe four possible ways in which isolated
waters could affect interstate commerce, such as waters used for the removal of fish sold in
interstate commerce, or the use of waters for agricultural purposes to produce products sold
in interstate commerce. Id. at 37,128. The Corps made clear, however, that this was not in-
tended as an inclusive list, and thus the 1986 "migratory bird rule" was merely intended as
another possible example of how isolated waters might affect interstate commerce. See Final
Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,216, 41,216-17
(Nov. 13, 1986).
200. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 184-85 n.12 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
201. The site was home to the second largest breeding colony of Great Blue Herons in
northeastern Illinois. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 194. Among the other species that used the
site were the Great Egret, the Green-Backed Heron, the Black-Crowned Night Heron, the
Canada Goose, the Wood Duck, the Mallard, the Greater Yellowlegs, and the Belted King-
fisher. See id. at 194 n.16.
202. See id. at 194 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
203. As suggested in more detail below, Congress's power to regulate activities affecting
migratory birds is protected under the treaty power even if it is not supported by the Com-
merce Clause. See infra notes 294-295 and accompanying text.
204. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Rapanos v. United States, No. 04-
1034, and Carabell v. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 04-1384, and consolidated the cases for
review. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
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waters.0 5 Unlike Riverside, however, the wetlands in Rapanos and
Carabell were not adjacent to the navigable waters themselves.2 0 '
This distinction was critical to Justice Scalia's plurality opinion.
John Rapanos owned three tracts of land near Midland, Michi-201
gan. On the 230 acre Salzburg site, Rapanos proposed to build a
shopping center.2 08 The Michigan Department of Natural Re-
sources, which administers the section 404 program for the state
under the Corps' supervision, inspected the site and advised Ra-
panos that the land likely included wetlands that would require a
section 404 permit.29 Rapanos hired a consultant who confirmed
the presence of many acres of wetlands, 210 but Rapanos nonetheless
chose to proceed with land-clearing and filling activities without
seeking a permit.2 1 He did the same on his two other sites-a 275-
acre Hines Road site and a 200-acre Pine River site--destroying an
estimated seventeen acres of wetlands on the former and fifteen
acres of wetlands on the latter.2 12- All of the sites were adjacent to
non-navigable tributaries of traditionally navigable waters.13
June and Keith Carabell owned twenty acres of land, sixteen of
which were wetlands.1 4 Like the lands in Riverside the site was ap-
proximately one mile from Lake St. Clair. 5 Unlike Riverside,
however, the Carabell site was not adjacent to navigable waters, but
216rather to a ditch that was a tributary to navigable waters. The
ditch was hydrologically separated from the site by a man-made
berm.2 7 Carabell applied for a permit to fill the wetlands to ac-
commodate the construction of a 112 unit condominium complex.
The permit was denied for ecological reasons.2 18
205. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2219 ("In these consolidated cases [Rapanos and Carabell, we
consider whether four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or man-made drains that
eventually empty into traditional navigable waters, constitute 'waters of the United States'
within the meaning of the Act.").
206. Id. at 2214.
207. Id. at 2238 (KennedyJ., concurring).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rapanos "threatened to 'destroy' Dr. Goff [the
consultant] if he did not destroy the wetland report, and refused to pay Dr. Goff unless and
until he complied." Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208 at








218. Id. at 2239 (KennedyJ., concurring).
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The five opinions in the Rapanos and Carabell cases expose sharp
divisions among members of the Court about the scope of the
CWA and leave some doubt as to the current state of the law. Writ-
ing for a four person plurality, and relying primarily on the
definition of "waters" from the 1954 edition of Webster's New Interna-
tional Dictionary, Justice Scalia found that "['waters of the United
States'] includes only those relatively permanent, standing or con-
tinuously flowing bodies of water 'forming geographic features'
that are described in ordinary parlance as 'streams[,] ... oceans,
rivers, [and] lakes."219 He conceded that there was an "inherent
ambiguity" in attempting to draw a line between water and land,
and so he deferred to the Corps' decision to include wetlands that
actually abut "traditional navigable waters., 20 Beyond this, however,
he refused to recognize the Corps' authority. He wholly rejected
the dissent's claim that Congress acquiesced to the Corps' rules,
and that those rules merit deference under the Chevron doctrine. 1
Regarding the issue of deference, he found that whatever ambigu-
ity might exist with respect to the meaning of the phrase "waters of
the United States," it does not extend to "whether storm drains
and dry ditches are 'waters.' ,222
One of the government's chief concerns with adopting a narrow
construction of the phrase "navigable waters" was its implication
for regulating industrial discharges under section 402 of the CWA,
because the definition of "navigable waters" applied to the entire
Act.223 Scalia dismissed this concern.2 24 Even though the same defi-
nition might apply, he noted, the law prohibits "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters," 25 and since industrial discharges
219. Id. at 2225 (plurality opinion). Scalia makes clear that "relatively permanent" could
encompass "seasonal rivers which contain continuous flow during some months of the year,
but no flow during dry months." Id. at 2221 n.5. But he leaves for another day the extent to
which such intermittent streams might be covered by the law. Streams that come and go at
intervals and that are "broken and fitful" are plainly not covered under this analysis.
220. Id. at 2225.
221. Id. at 2220-25.
222. Id. at 2232. It is hard to know whether Scalia viewed Rapanos as a "step one" or
"step two" case under the Chevron test. At first blush, he seems to say that the statute is clear,
and that the case can thus be resolved under step one. Id. at 2225 ("In sum, on its only plausi-
be interpretation, the phrase 'the waters of the United States' includes only those relatively
permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodes of water .... ) (emphasis added). Two
sentences later, however, he states that the Corps' interpretation "is thus not 'based on a
permissible construction of the statute'"-a phrase that is only relevant under step two,
where the Court finds the language of a statute ambiguous. Id. Perhaps Scalia was merely
suggesting that the statute was clear (step one), but that even if it were ambiguous (step
two), the agency's interpretation was unreasonable.
223. Id. at 2227.
224. Id.
225. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (A) (2000) (emphasis added).
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into tributaries can ultimately result in the addition of a pollutant
into traditional navigable waters, the scope of section 402 was not
unduly impacted by his decision. 6 By contrast, Scalia argued that
the dredged or fill material that is the subject of the section 404
program does not add a pollutant to navigable water because it
"does not normally wash downstream."
22 7
Justice Roberts, who joined the plurality opinion, wrote a brief
concurring opinion that seems somewhat at odds with the plurality.
Roberts lamented the fact that the Corps and the EPA failed to fol-
low through with a proposed rule that would have clarified the
scope of waters that are covered by the CWA in light of the
SWANCC decision.28 Had they done so, Roberts suggested that he
would have accorded them "generous leeway... [g]iven the broad,
somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Con-
gress employed in the Clean Water Act ... ,,229 However, SWANCC
dealt with "isolated waters" and clarifying the scope of the Corps'
authority over isolated waters would not have had much relevance
to Justice Scalia's conclusion that "waters of the United States" do
not include intermittent streams, even if they bear a hydrological
220connection to navigable waters. 3 Indeed, Carabell's lawyers spe-
cifically tailored their argument to claim that the subject wetlands
were isolated just as in SWANCC.23' They even conceded that the
Corps had jurisdiction over isolated wetlands if they could
demonstrate a hydrological connection-a concession that would
have proved unnecessary had the Rapanos plurality view pre-
vailed. Moreover, the plurality suggested that its reading of the
statute was the only permissible reading.232 Given this finding, it is
hard to see how the plurality would grant "generous leeway"23 4 to
the Corps in promulgating new rules.
226. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2227.
227. Id. at 2228. Both Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion and Justice Stevens in
his dissenting opinion noted the likelihood that the discharged material will release sedi-
ments and other pollutants that will indeed wash downstream. Id. at 2245 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Id. at 2263 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
228. Id. at 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
229. Id.
230. The Corps was certainly free to address the scope of its authority more broadly,
and as ChiefJustice Roberts noted, the agency had invited broad comments on the scope of
its jurisdiction, but the plurality's analysis of the Rapanos and Carabell cases would not have
been helped by clarifying the meaning of SWANCC. Id.
231. Brief for the Petitioner at 39-40, Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 126 S. Ct.
2208 (2006) (No. 04-1384).
232. Id. at 28-29.
233. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225.
234. See supra text accompanying note 222.
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The key opinion in the case was Justice Kennedy's. 5 Kennedy
concurred in the plurality's decision to remand the case for further
fact-finding. 36 However, Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's
finding that the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction is not limited to
the traditional definition of navigable waters.23 '7 Furthermore, he
rejected outright two key findings by the plurality: (1) that "navi-
gable waters" encompass only "relatively permanent, standing or
flowing bodies of water,"'2 38 and (2) that wetlands are covered by the
Act only if they bear a "continuous surface connection to bodies
that are 'waters of the United States' in their own right., 239 Ken-
nedy, a westerner, was especially critical of the plurality's failure to
appreciate the ephemeral nature of many major river systems in
the west. As he noted, under the plurality's approach, "the merest
trickle, if continuous, would count as a 'water' subject to federal
regulation, while torrents thundering at irregular intervals through
otherwise dry channels would not.",240 Kennedy's alternative ap-
proach relied heavily on a single reference from SWANCC
requiring a showing of a "significant nexus" between the wetlands
and navigable waters. 241 But Kennedy's reading of this standard was
much more generous than the plurality's reading:
Consistent with SWANCC and Riverside Bayview and with the
need to give the term "navigable" some meaning, the Corps'
jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a
significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navi-
gable waters in the traditional sense. The required nexus must
be assessed in terms of the statute's goals and purposes. Con-
gress enacted the law to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,"...
and it pursued that objective by restricting dumping and fill-
ing in "navigable waters" . . . . With respect to wetlands, the
235. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
236. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (KennedyJ., concurring).
237. Kennedy acknowledged that "Congress' choice of words creates difficulties ... the
word 'navigable' in the Act must be given some effect." Id. at 2247. He went on to state:
Consistent with SWANCC and Riverside Bayview and with the need to give the term
'navigable' some meaning, the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the
existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable wa-
ters in the traditional sense.
Id. at 2248.
238. Id. at 2242.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2246, 2248-50.
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rationale for Clean Water Act regulation is, as the Corps has
recognized, that wetlands can perform critical functions re-
lated to the integrity of other waters-functions such as
pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff storage .... Ac-
cordingly, wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus
come within the statutory phrase "navigable waters," if the
wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situ-
ated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as "navigable." When, in contrast, wet-
lands' effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial,
they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory
term "navigable waters.,
242
Kennedy also clarified that the Corps may regulate wetlands ad-
jacent to waters considered navigable under the traditional test
without any further showing.24 3 He further acknowledged that the
Corps may lawfully identify by regulation "categories of tributaries"
that are sufficiently significant that wetlands adjacent to them can
be protected on the basis of adjacency alone. 4 For wetlands adja-
cent to non-significant, non-navigable tributaries, however,
Kennedy would require the Corps to "establish a significant nexus
on a case-by-case basis."
2 45
Because the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had failed to
specifically find a significant nexus between the wetlands and navi-
gable waters in either the Rapanos or Carabell cases, Kennedy found
that a remand was necessary. 246 Regarding Rapanos, Kennedy re-
jected the Sixth Circuit's finding that a significant nexus can be
found merely by showing a hydrologic connection. 47 Rather, he
would require a showing of "some measure of the significance of
the connection for downstream water quality.2 48 On the other
hand, with respect to Carabell, Kennedy agreed with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's finding that a hydrologic connection was not necessary to
show a significant nexus: "[g]iven the role wetlands play in pollut-
ant filtering, flood control, and runoff storage, it may well be the
absence of hydrologic connection (in the sense of interchange of
waters) that shows the wetlands' significance for the aquatic
242. Id. at 2248 (emphasis added).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2249.
246. Id. at 2250.
247. Id. at 2250-51.
248. Id. at 2250.
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system.", 4 9 Nonetheless, because the Corps in this case had based its
jurisdiction solely on the adjacency of the land to a ditch, "[a]






Justice Stevens wrote the principal dissent. In Stevens' view, Riv-
erside "squarely controls" the outcome of the Rapanos and Carabell
cases. 251 While Riverside involved a wetland adjacent to a navigable
waterway, Stevens noted that the issue in that case had been
framed as whether section 404 permits were required for the dis-
charge of fill material "into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies
of waters and their tributaries."2 2 Stevens also emphasized the Court's
finding in Riverside that under Chevronjudicial review was limited to
the question of "whether it is reasonable, in light of the language,
policies, and legislative history of the Act for the Corps to exercise
jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to but not regularly flooded by
rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features more convention-
ally identifiable as 'waters.' ,253
In Riverside, the Court found that the Corps' rules encompassing
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries were
reasonable even if they might include some wetlands not signifi-
cantly intertwined with the ecosystem of adjacent waterways, "for
where it appears that a wetland covered by the Corps' definition is
in fact lacking in importance to the aquatic environment ... the
Corps may always allow development of the wetland for other uses
simply by issuing a permit. "254 In contrast to Riverside, Stevens found
the plurality's reliance on SWANCC to be misplaced because
SWANCC involved the Corps' jurisdiction over isolated waters and
"had nothing to say about wetlands, let alone about wetlands adja-
cent to traditionally navigable waters or their tributaries.,
25
5
While Stevens was highly critical of the plurality opinion, he was
more generous toward Kennedy's concurrence, taking issue pri-
marily with Kennedy's finding that a significant nexus between
wetlands and navigable waters must be shown before those wet-
216
lands are subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. As Stevens pointed
249. Id. at 2251.
250. Id. at 2252.
251. Id. at 2255 (StevensJ., dissenting).
252. Id. (emphasis in original).
253. Id. at 2255 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131
(1985)).
254. Id. at 2256 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135).
255. Id.
256. Referring to the plurality opinion as well as Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens had the following to say at the beginning of his dissent:
[VOL. 40:4
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out, the "significant nexus" reference was an effort by the SWANCC
Court to characterize the Riverside decision, and that decision pur-
portedly encompassed wetlands adjacent to both navigable waters
and their tributaries. Moreover, Stevens noted that because wet-
lands adjacent to navigable tributaries generally do significantly
affect traditional navigable waters by preserving water flows and
protecting water quality, the Corps' longstanding rules could not
211fairly be criticized as overbroad as applied to such tributaries.
Stevens conceded, however, that the "significant nexus" test "will
probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands covered
,,259Jby the Act in the long run.
D. Understanding Rapanos
Justice Kennedy's opinion is crucial to the way in which Rapanos
will serve as precedent in the future. If the Corps can demonstrate
a significant nexus between wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
tributaries and navigable waters then jurisdiction over those wet-
lands would have the support of five members of the Court-the
four dissenters and Justice Kennedy.2 ' But understanding Rapanos
requires further analysis of several key issues.
The broader question is whether regulations that have protected the quality of our
waters for decades, that were implicitly approved by Congress, and that have been re-
peatedly enforced in case after case, must now be revised in light of the creative
criticisms voiced by the plurality andJustice KENNEDY today. Rejecting more than 30
years of practice by the Army Corps, the plurality disregards the nature of the con-
gressional delegation to the agency and the technical and complex character of the
issues at stake. Justice KENNEDY similarly fails to defer sufficiently to the Corps,
though his approach is far more faithful to our precedents and to principles of statu-
tory interpretation than is the plurality's.
Id. at 2252.
257. Id. at 2264. In a separate dissenting opinion,Justice Breyer also took issue with the
nexus requirement. In his view, the Corps' authority under the Clean Water Act "extends to
the limits of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce." Id. at 2266. Under this
standard, he would have no problem finding these cases within the Corps'jurisdiction. Id.
258. ld. at 2264.
259. Id.
260. Stevens argued that the Corps jurisdiction should be upheld if on remand either
the plurality's test orJustice Kennedy's test is met, although he acknowledged that it is Ken-
nedy's opinion that will likely be controlling. Id. at 2265, 2265 n.14. More generally, the
Supreme Court has indicated that "[w] hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds .... '" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ)). Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has already followed this
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
First, as the divergent opinions suggest, the language of the
CWA and its legislative history are at least somewhat at odds with
one another. While Congress chose to use the phrase "navigable
waters," there are good arguments to support the dissent's view
that it never meant "navigable" in any conventional-or "tradi-
tional"-sense of that word. Perhaps the most compelling evidence
in support of this argument stems simply from the fact that-as
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in SWANCC 26-the goals of the
1972 CWA have nothing to do with navigation. The Act's purpose
is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters.""2 " That purpose cannot practically
be achieved without recognizing the integrated nature of the hy-
drologic cycle and the need to protect the water resource at every
263stage of its existence. Even water vapor can be compromised
when it interacts with pollutants to form acid rain and can lead to
significant contamination of surface water supplies.64 Plainly, a
narrow definition of the phrase "navigable waters" as used in the
CWA is not adequate to achieve the statute's broad purposes.
Moreover, Congress was fully aware of the relevance of the hy-
drologic cycle to pollution control and of the critical need to• 265
include tributaries within the scope of the law. This broad intent
principle in interpreting Rapanos. United States v. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th
Cir. 2006) ("When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case
and not on the ground for that outcome, lower-court judges are to follow the narrowest
ground to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose. In Ra-
panos, that is Justice Kennedy's ground.") (internal citation omitted). But see Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); United States v. Johnson, 467 E3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006)
(following Justice Stevens' suggestion in his Rapanos dissent that future courts may find
federal jurisdiction over wetlands using either the plurality or Justice Kennedy's standard
from Rapanos, instead of findingJustice Kennedy's standard to be controlling).
261. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159, 181 (2001) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
262. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000).
263. See nationalatlas.gov, Water of the United States, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/
water.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) ("Although water that is temporarily diverted from the
hydrologic cycle is eventually returned back to the cycle, the quality of that 'used' water
usually is changed").
264. See Megacity Initiative: Local and Global Research Observations, Air Pollution and
Water, http://www.windows.ucar.edu/tour/link=/milagro/effects/water-watersheds.html
(last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (describing how nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide dissolve in
water vapor to form acid rain). While such discharges are generally regulated under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 0 1-7 6 7 1q, there is no compelling reason for denying EPA the
authority to control such pollution under the CWA as well if necessary to achieve the Act's
fundamental purposes.
265. The 1977 Senate report described the scope of the Act as follows:
Initial consideration of the section 404 controversy stimulated discussion on the ex-
tent of the waters in which discharges of dredged or fill material will be regulated.
[VOL. 40:4
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was further suggested-though somewhat ambiguously-by final
changes made to the definition of "navigable waters." The original
Senate bill expressly included "tributaries" within the definition 2"6
while the House bill defined "navigable waters" as "navigable waters
of the United States.117 The final language removed both the ref-
erence to tributaries and navigable from the definition.2 6 But in
explaining these changes the conferees plainly indicated their in-
tention "that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency
determinations which have been made or may be made for admin-
istrative purposes.,269
The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act exercised comprehensive jurisdiction
over the Nation's waters to control pollution to the fullest constitutional extent. In its
report on that legislation, the Senate Public Works Committee stated 'waters move in
hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source.
Restriction of jurisdiction to those relatively few waterways that are used or are sus-
ceptible to use for navigation would render this purpose impossible to achieve.
Discharges of dredged or fill material into lakes and tributaries of these waters can
physically disrupt the chemical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters and ad-
versely affect their quality. The presence of toxic pollutants in these materials
compounds this pollution problem and further dictates that the adverse effects of
such materials must be addressed where the material is first discharged into the Na-
tion's waters. To limit the jurisdiction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with
reference to discharges of the pollutants of dredged or fill material would cripple ef-
forts to achieve the act's objectives.
S. REP. No. 95-370, at 75 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4400.
266. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972), reprinted in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ENVTL. POL-
icy Div., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972, at 1495 (1973).
267. H.R. 11896, 92d Cong. § 502(8) (2nd Sess. 1971), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. 1069
(emphasis added).
268. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006) ("The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the
United States .... ).
269. S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. 327. On the House
floor, Congressman John Dingell further explained the conferees' intent regarding the
scope of the law:
The conference bill defines the term "navigable waters" broadly for water quality
purposes. It means all "the waters of the United States" in a geographical sense. It does not
mean "navigable waters of the United States" in the technical sense as we sometimes
see in some laws .... The authority of Congress over navigable waters is based on the
Constitution's grant to Congress of "Power ... to regulate commerce with Foreign
Nations and among the several States .... " Although most interstate commerce 150
years ago was accomplished on waterways, there is no requirement in the Constitu-
tion that the waterway must cross a State boundary in order to be within the
interstate commerce power of the Federal Government. Rather, it is enough that the
waterway serves as a link in the chain of commerce among the States as it flows in the
various channels of transportation-highways, railroads, air traffic, radio and postal
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On the other hand, there remains the nagging problem that
Congress chose to use the phrase "navigable waters" to define the
scope of the Act. Even Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Rapanos, saw
the need to defend his opinion against Justice Kennedy's claim
that Stevens' reading of the law failed to give meaning to the word
"navigable. 270
Second, even accepting that the phrase "navigable waters"
should be given its "traditional" meaning, as five Justices do, the
plurality and concurring opinions are devoid of any analysis ex-
plaining how that term has "traditionally" been viewed by the
Court. Yet the phrase has a rich history that suggests a far more
ambiguous meaning-one highly dependent on context-than any
of the five justices in the plurality seem to appreciate. While the
plurality and concurring opinions faithfully cite The Daniel Ball
71
and United States v. Appalachian Electric Powe 72-two important
cases addressing the meaning of the term "navigability"-they fail
to note that even these two seminal cases fundamentally disagree
on the meaning of the term. The most commonly cited definition
of navigability comes from The Daniel Ball, which involved a federal
law requiring a license for passenger steam ships operating upon
"the navigable waters of the United States."7 3 In considering the
scope of the law, the Court announced that:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in
law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on waterY
4
communication, waterways, et cetera. The "gist of the Federal test" is the waterway's
use "as a highway," not whether it is "part of navigable interstate or international commercial
highway." Thus, this new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including
main streams and their tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer are the old,
narrow definitions of navigability, as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to
govern matters covered by this bill.
118 CONG. REC. 33,756-57 (Oct. 4, 1972) (emphasis added).
270. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This
logical connection [between wetlands adjacent to tributaries and traditional navigable wa-
ters] alone gives the wetlands the 'limited' connection to traditional navigable waters ...
and disproves Justice Kennedy's claim that my approach gives no meaning to the word
'navigable.' ").
271. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
272. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power, 311 U.S. 377 (1940).




Nearly seventy years later, in the Appalachian Electric Power case,
the Court took a different view:
The legal concept of navigability embraces both public and
private interests. It is not to be determined by a formula
which fits every type of stream under all circumstances and at
all times. Our past decisions have taken due account of the
changes and complexities in the circumstances of a river. We
do not purport now to lay down any single definitive test. We
draw from the prior decisions in this field and apply them,
with due regard to the dynamic nature of the problem .... To
appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural condition
only of the waterway is erroneous. Its availability for naviga-
tion must also be considered .... A waterway, otherwise
suitable for navigation, is not barred from that classification
merely because artificial aids must make the highway suitable
for use before commercial navigation may be undertaken ....
Nor is it necessary that the improvements should be actually
completed or even authorized. The power of Congress over
commerce is not to be hampered because of the necessity for
reasonable improvements to make an interstate waterway
available for traffic. 75
The Appalachian Electric Power case thus effectively eliminated the
requirement that waters be navigable "in their ordinary condition"
and expressly recognized "the dynamic nature of the problem."
276
Moreover, as far back as 1903 the Court made clear that even artifi-
cial channels such as canals can be navigable waters for purposes of
determining the scope of federal power.177
More recently, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that the
phrase "navigable waters" means different things in different con-
texts. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Supreme Court found that
a pond that had been dredged and connected to the Pacific Ocean
was navigable for purposes of the federal government's regulatory
authority.278 In so finding, it rejected the government's claim that
navigability has a "fixed meaning":
The position advanced by the Government ... presumes that
the concept of "navigable waters of the United States" has a
fixed meaning that remains unchanged in whatever context it
275. Appalachian Elec. Power, 311 U.S. at 404-08.
276. Id. at 404, 407.
277. Perry v. Haines, 191 U.S. 17, 29 (1903).
278. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,172 (1979).
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is being applied.... [W]e ... agree with [the District Court's]
conclusion that all of this Court's cases dealing with the au-
thority of Congress to regulate navigation ... cannot simply
be lumped into one basket. As the District Court aptly stated,
"any reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated
upon careful appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of
'navigability' was invoked in a particular case.,2 7 9
The Court went on to recognize that the concept of navigability
has been construed differently in at least four different contexts:
(1) delimiting the boundaries of the navigational servitude; (2)
determining the scope of regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause; (3) determining the scope of authority under the
RHA; and (4) establishing the limits of federal jurisdiction over
admiralty cases. 280 Furthermore, although the Court does not say so
in Kaiser Aetna, it has used a somewhat different test for navigability
to determine ownership of the tide to the bed of navigable
streams.2 8 1
Third, beyond the meaning of "navigable waters," the meaning
of the word "navigable" is itself far from clear. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a river or stream may be navigable
even where it fails to meet Justice Scalia's test of "relatively perma-
nent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water." In Economy
Light & Power Co. v. United States,2 s2 the Court held that:
"[n]avigability ... is not destroyed because the watercourse is in-
terrupted by occasional natural obstructions or portages; nor need
the navigation be open at all seasons of the year, or at all stages of the
water."
2
Moreover, courts have accepted claims of navigability based on
evidence that a body of water is capable of being traversed by a ca-
noe, even if it has never actually been traversed by a canoe.284 Even
279. Id. at 170-71 (emphasis in original).
280. Id. at 171-72.
281. See United States v. Sasser, 967 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1992) (construing Kaiser
Aetna as approving at least four different tests for determining navigability: (1) ebb and flow,
(2) connection with a continuous interstate waterway, (3) navigable capacity, and (4) navi-
gable in fact).
282. Econ. Light& Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
283. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
284. See FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 287 F.3d 1151
(D.C. Cir. 2002). In this case, the court sustained FERC's conclusion that the Messalonskee
Stream, a tributary of the Kennebec River in Maine, was navigable based upon three "test"
trips in a canoe made for purposes of the litigation as well as FERC's determination that that
the physical characteristics of the stream rendered it suitable for commercial navigation. Id.
at 1155. All parties to the case had acknowledged that there was no evidence that the stream
had ever been used for commercial or even recreational purposes. Id. In the course of de-
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a ditch or canal with a seasonal water supply that is capable of sup-
porting a canoe might therefore be deemed "navigable." Thus,
while navigability is an inherently ambiguous term, it is not espe-
cially limiting. Given the ambiguity surrounding the phrase
"navigable waters" and the word "navigability," it seems most ap-
propriate for courts to accord broad deference to an agency in its
efforts to construe the these words in the context in which they
were written and in a manner that satisfies congressional intent."'5
Fourth, the argument that Congress intended the phrase "navi-
gable waters" to include non-navigable tributaries is bolstered by
the language from one of the progenitors of the CWA, section 13
of the RHA. As described previously,2 6 that provision, sometimes
called the Refuse Act, makes it unlawful to:
[T]hrow, discharge, or deposit ... any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever ... into any navigable water of
the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such navi-
gable water; and it shall not be lawful to deposit ... material
of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water,
or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the
same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, ei-
ther by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise .... 287
It seems highly unlikely that in adopting a more robust pollution
control program with the passage of the 1972 FWPCA Congress
would have intended the law to apply to only a small fraction of the
288
waters covered under section 13 of the RHA.
ciding the case, the court referenced FERC's prior determinations that streams that are only
suitable for kayaking by expert paddlers (as opposed to canoeing) are not navigable. Id. at
1158. This distinction has been criticized. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What is a Navigable
River? Canoes Count but Kayaks Do Not, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1067 (2003).
285. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984). Under the familiar Chevron test for reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, a
court must first ask whether the statute is clear. Id. at 842-43. If it is, the court enforces the
statute. Id. at 843-45. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, the court will defer to any rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute by an agency, at least when the agency has announced
its interpretation in a notice and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. Id.; see
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (suggesting that interpretive rules not
promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking are not entitled to Chevron defer-
ence).
286. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
287. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000) (emphasis added).
288. See Lance Wood, Don't Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to All Non-Navigable Tibu-
taries of the Traditional Navigable Waters and to Their Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVT'L L. REP.
10,187, 10,201 (2004).
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Fifth, whether one agrees or disagrees with Justice Scalia's con-
clusion, his analytical approach to this case is divorced from the
reality of two centuries of American water law. Scalia blithely
brushes away years of judicial and administrative precedent flesh-
ing out in great detail the meaning of the phrase "navigable
waters" in favor of a common dictionary definition of the word
"waters," which he then argues offers the "only plausible interpre-
tation" of the word and thus the scope of a major environmental
law.289 The dictionary definition used by the plurality, which en-
compasses "only those relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographic features
." bears no clear relation to traditional notions of navigability
nor, as Justice Kennedy observed, does it square with the practical
realities of watercourses in the Western United States.2 90 Thus, far
from clarifying the law, Scalia's approach only serves to obscure it.
What is perhaps most unsettling about the plurality's decision is
that it commands the support of four members of the Court and
was reached without even the benefit of briefing. 9'
Finally, it must be observed that however convoluted wetlands
law has become as a result of the Rapanos decision, the Court has
not raised serious questions about the federal government's consti-
tutional authority to adopt a comprehensive wetlands regulation
program. To be sure, some expressions of doubt were voiced by
Justice Rehnquist in the SWANCC decision2 92 and by Justice Scalia
289. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2225 (2006).
290. Id. The absence of Justice O'Connor from the decision in this case is palpable.
O'Connor's knowledge and practical experience as a Western rancher would surely have
helped ground the outcome in the realities of water law. While it is hard to know how
O'Connor would have come down on the merits of these cases, it is hard to imagine that she
would have been persuaded to support a dictionary definition of water that was so far re-
moved from the reality of her native Arizona. While Justice Kennedy-the only Westerner
now on the Court-notes many of these same problems with the plurality opinion in his
concurrence, O'Connor's credibility on these issues might well have swayed at least one
other member of the Court away from the approach announced by the plurality.
291. See id. at 2259 (Stevens,J., dissenting). The plurality opinion may seem plausible to
those unfamiliar with watercourses and the law that has evolved over the past two centuries,
but it calls to mind an earlier mistake by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Charlestone Stone Products Co. v. Andrus, 553 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1977). There the Ninth Cir-
cuit decided-without the benefit of briefing-that water is a mineral for purposes of the
General Mining Law of 1872. Id. As with the plurality opinion in this case, that conclusion
seemed plausible to those unfamiliar with the mining law. At a simplistic definitional level,
water surely is a mineral. But as a unanimous Supreme Court found in overturning the ap-
peals court decision, Congress never intended that water should be treated as a locatable
mineral for purposes of the mining law. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S.
604 (1978).
292. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (noting the significant constitutional questions raised
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in Rapanos.23 But a clear majority of the Court appears willing to
accept that the Congress has the constitutional power to regulate
activities that impact most wetlands. Indeed, even if the Commerce
Clause does not fully authorize Congress's power to regulate wet-
lands, Congress plainly has additional authority under the Treaty
Clause and perhaps the Property Clause that could overcome those
limitations at least in some cases. The Necessary and Proper Clause
gives Congress the power to adopt laws necessary and proper for
the execution of treaties.9 4 The United States has adopted various
migratory bird treaties which afford ample authority for the migra-
tory bird rule, even if it would not pass muster under the
Commerce Clause.295
On the other hand, the fact that the application of section 404
in a particular case might lead to a valid takings claimss does not
render the general requirement for permits to fill wetlands or
other waters unconstitutional.297 In a similar context, the Supreme
Court held that general requirements to comply with mining and
mine reclamation standards under the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act do not render the law unconstitutional on its
face.298
by Corps' assertion that CWAjurisdiction extends to intrastate, non-navigable, isolated wet-
lands).
293. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 (noting that the Corps' interpretation stretches the
outer limits of Congress' commerce power and raises difficult questions about the ultimate
scope of that power). But see id. at 2249 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that regulation
of wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that possess a significant nexus with navi-
gable waters will raise no serious constitutional or federalism difficulties).
294. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. The Supreme Court has held that legislation imple-
menting a valid treaty is likewise valid under the necessary and proper clause. See Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (concerning the Migratory Bird Treaty between the United
States and Great Britain); see also Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty
Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (2006).
295. For example, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-1] (2000), is the
domestic law that implements the United States' commitment to four international conven-
tions (with Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Russia) for the protection of shared migratory bird
resources. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918,
http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/intrnltr/treatlaw.html#mbta (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
296. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 E3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(holding that denying a § 404 permit could amount to categorical taking if permit denial
had effect of denying owner all economically viable use of property).
297. Since the enactuent of the Clean Water Act more than thirty years ago, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly affirmed the authority of the federal government to regulate
wetlands, most recently in Rapanos itself. See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208-35.
298. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268 (1981).
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E. The Fallout from Rapanos
A mere nine days after the Supreme Court reached its decision
in Rapanos, a federal district court in Texas handed down a deci-
sion that aptly illustrates the uncertainty and confusion that
Rapanos has caused, and the possible impact that the decision may
have on the government's ability to enforce water pollution stan-
dards. In United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., the United States
brought an action against Chevron after a corroded pipeline
leaked 3,000 barrels of oil into an ephemeral creek.2 0 The action
was brought under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), which imposes
strict liability for natural resource damages and removal costs for
the discharge of oil "into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining
shorelines." 30 0 As with the CWA, "navigable waters" are defined in
the OPA as "waters of the United States."
0 '1
The unnamed creek that received the discharge flows into Ennis
Creek, which flows into Rough Creek, and then to the Double
Mountain Fork of the Brazos River.02 Only the Double Mountain
Fork flowed continuously, although no clear finding was made as
to whether it was "navigable."03 The three creeks feeding into the
Double Mountain Fork flowed only in response to rainfall events. 4
The unnamed creek enters Ennis Creek 17.5 miles upstream from
Rough Creek, which enters the Double Mountain Fork 23.8 miles
later.0°
The spill occurred 500 feet upstream of the confluence with En-
nis Creek and extended to that confluence.0 The evidence showed
that there was no flowing water in the creek from the time of the
spill in August, 2000 until October 12, 2000, when the first rainfall
event occurred.3 7 Chevron claimed that by the time of the rainfall,
it had completed remedial measures.308 The United States pro-
duced evidence indicating that extensive areas of oil contaminated
soil remained until some time after October 12 .sr
299. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 607 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
300. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2000).
301. Id. §2701(21).





307. Id. at 607.




Chevron filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, among
other things, that the spill did not involve navigable waters. 3 ' The
district court agreed.31 Much of the district court's analysis is ques-
tionable. The court relies essentially on dictum from a Fifth Circuit
decision suggesting that "navigable waters" had to meet the "navi-
gable in fact" test or be adjacent to such waters,312 as well as on the
Supreme Court's Rapanos decision. On the basis of these authori-
ties, the district court concluded that Chevron's motion should be
granted unless "there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the farthest traverse of the spill is a navigable-in-fact water




This characterization of the issue, following Justice Scalia's plu-
rality opinion in Rapanos, effectively ignores the significant nexus
test from SWANCC and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Rapanos. But the district court's characterization seems wrong even
under Scalia's analysis. While Scalia clearly would define "navigable
waters" narrowly so as not to include the ephemeral creek into
which the oil in Chevron Pipe Line spilled, he nonetheless recog-
nized that discharges into non-navigable, intermittent waters that
flow into navigable waters might be encompassed by the law. In
particular, he notes approvingly that "from the time of the CWA's
enactment, lower courts have held that the discharge into intermit-
tent channels of any pollutant that naturally washes downstream likely
violates [the CWA], even if the pollutants discharged from a point
source do not emit 'directly into' covered waters, but pass 'through
conveyances' in between."3 5 Thus, Scalia might find that the spill
in Chevron Pipe Line, while discharged into a non-navigable water-
way, would still violate the CWA.
Whether or not the court in Chevron Pipe Line got the law right, it
helps to show how Rapanos has further complicated an issue that
had already created substantial confusion for the regulated and
regulators alike. A growing number of courts have had to grapple
with this problem,1 and the ad hoc nature of the significant nexus
310. Id.
311. Id. at 615.
312. Id. at 611-12 (citing In reNeedham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003)).
313. Id. at 615 ("Therefore, based upon the arguments contained in Chevron's Brief in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the Fifth Circuit's reasoning con-
tained in In re Needham and the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States,
this Court finds that the subject discharge of oil did not reach navigable waters of the
United States and adjoining shorelines. Accordingly, Chevron's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment is granted.").
314. Id. at 614.
315. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2227 (2006) (emphasis in original).
316. See, e.g., San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., Nos. 04-17554, 05-15051, 2007
WL 686352, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2007) (holding that a body of water not a wetland
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test assures that substantial additional resources will be spent at the
administrative and judicial levels just to sort through the basic
question of federal jurisdiction. 7 The time and money spent on
resolving these jurisdictional issues would be far better spent on
the ground to protect the wetlands themselves.
V. THE NEED FOR POLICY REFORM
The Rapanos, SWANCC, and Riverside decisions have plainly cre-
ated ajurisdictional muddle. For different reasons, Justices Roberts
and Kennedy suggested that this confusion might present an op-
portunity for the Corps to promulgate new rules that clarify the
scope of the Corps' authority."8 There are good reasons for the
Corps to proceed with such a rulemaking. In the end, however, real
clarity will only come if Congress intercedes and amends the law to
flesh out its intent. This Part fully explores the rulemaking and leg-
islative options.
A. Rulemaking: Explaining the "Significant Nexus" Test
Rapanos raises questions about the approach to jurisdiction
taken under the current rules. While those rules rely substantially
on the Corps' primary authority over non-navigable tributaries, a
majority of the Court seems reluctant to accept that authority. For
that reason, the Corps should consider rules that accomplish three
principal things."9 First, the Corps should flesh out and explain
adjacent to navigable waters did not qualify as "waters of the United States"); N. Cal. River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding jurisdiction over
discharge into a rock pond that was connected by groundwater to the Russian River under a
significant nexus analysis); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL
2221629 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006) (upholding jurisdiction using the significant nexus test
over discharge of a pollutant into a stream that was either itself a covered water or that
flowed into a covered water).
317. Moreover, at least one court does not agree that Justice Kennedy's "significant
nexus" standard from his Rapanos concurrence is the controlling opinion: the First Circuit
recently remanded a case on the issue of regulatory jurisdiction with the specific instructions
that "the district court should do exactly as Justice Stevens has suggested [in his Rapanos
dissent] .... The federal government can establish jurisdiction over the target sites if it can
meet either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's standard as laid out in Rapanos." United
States v.Johnson, 467 F3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
318. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235-36 (Roberts, CJ., concurring); id. at 2248-49 (Ken-
nedy,J., concurring).
319. References to the Corps and rulemaking options should be understood to include
the EPA, which generally issues joint regulations with the Corps on matters relating to wet-
lands. SeeGAO-04-297, supra note 11.
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how it will determine jurisdiction based upon evidence of a signifi-
cant nexus between wetlands and navigable waters test. Justice
Kennedy has offered support for a generous test, but the Corps
should explain how it will administer the test in individual cases. In
particular, the Corps might accept Justice Kennedy's suggestion
that it identify "[t]hrough regulations or adjudication ... catego-
ries of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow (either annually
or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other rele-
vant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent
to them are likely [to fall under the Corps section 404 author-
ity] .,,320 As Kennedy intimated, the Corps' rules might essentially
create a rebuttable presumption in favor of jurisdiction in such
cases. The presumption could be rebutted only by providing ex-
pert evidence that the wetlands "either alone or in combination
with similarly situated lands in the region, [do not] significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other cov-
ered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.' ,,321 If written
well, these rules could assist in avoiding the cumbersome, case-by-
case analysis that is otherwise required for wetlands adjacent to
non-navigable tributaries.
Second, the facts in Rapanos suggest a need for the Corps to
adopt rules to ensure that any expert used to evaluate wetlands has
no pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome of the assess-
ment, and otherwise avoids any conflict of interest. 32 2 The
320. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
321. Id.
322. The Corps might, for example, require that the wetlands delineation report be re-
quested and paid for by the developer but prepared for the Corps. A good model for such
rules is the process for preparing mineral surveys for patents issued under the General Min-
ing Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 29 (2000). The mineral survey is used to delineate and mark
boundaries, describe improvements on the land, and resolve any conflicts with others claim-
ing an interest in the land. See generally 43 C.F.R. § 3861 (2005). The surveyor must be
chosen from a list of surveyors approved by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). Id.
§ 3861.5-1. The claimant arranges for and pays for the survey, but the surveyor and any
assistants must be disinterested parties. Id. § 3861.5-2. The surveyor's report and field notes
are provided to the BLM with a copy to the claimant. Id. § 3861.6-1. Most importantly, when
the surveyor is preparing the survey she is acting as an employee of the federal government
and not as an employee of the claimant. Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85 (1912).
In contrast to the rules for preparing mineral surveys, the GAO found in 2005 that the
use of a consultant to prepare a JD request or a permit application can affect the Corps'
decision on what data to review, noting the following:
Each district maintains a list of consultants whom residential homeowners and devel-
opers can use, although the Corps does not advocate or recommend specific
consultants or require that only those consultants on its lists be used. As a result, the
list can contain a number of consultants with varying levels of technical expertise. Ac-
cording to several project managers, if they have extensive experience with a
particular consultant and trust that consultant's work, they are more likely to limit
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developer, Rapanos, refused to pay his expert and threatened to
"destroy" him if he did not expunge the unfavorable report he had
prepared.323 Although the expert employed by Rapanos stood up to
him, it is easy to imagine that only those consultants who prepare
reports that minimize the identification of jurisdictional wetlands
will find favor with developers. Rules regarding preparation of en-
vironmental impact statements under NEPA might help inform the
content and scope of rules ensuring fair and independent deter-
minations ofjurisdictional wetlands. 24
Third, the Corps should address Justice Roberts' concern about
the need to clarify the result in SWANCC. While SWANCC suggests
that the Corps lacks authority to regulate isolated waters, the Corps
should consider rules that will help it assess whether waters are
truly isolated or whether a significant nexus between such waters
and navigable waters can be shown. While the Corps informally
makes these judgments already under the standard form used tomakejursditionl " • • 325
make jurisdictional determinations, the criteria that it uses
should be clarified.
Finally, both the Corps and the EPA should clarify when and
how waters are subject to federal authority under the CWA as a re-
sult of their potential to cause the "addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters. '2 6 While Justice Scalia makes this point in re-
sponse to the government's concern about its authority to regulate
industrial discharges under section 402 of the Clean Water Act,2 it
may apply as well to the addition of pollutants that occur as the
result of the discharge of dredged and fill material under a sec-
their review to the data submitted with the request, including any data on the types of
soils, plants, and hydrology the consultant may have collected for use in delineating
wetlands, along with questioning the consultant rather than independently verifying
the information with their own data sources.
GAO-05-870, supra note 148, at 25.
323. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
324. The regulations require, among other things, that any contractor involved in pre-
paring an EIS execute a disclosure statement "specifying that they have no financial or other
interest in the outcome of the project." 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (2006).
325. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,Jurisdictional Determination Form (Aug. 13, 2004),
available at http://www.spa.usace.army mil/reg/JurisdictionalDeterminations/QTRO1-
FY06/200300296.pdf (providing examples of the forms); U.S Army Corps of Engineers,
SWANCC Non-Jurisdictional Determinations in the Albuquerque District, http://
www.spa.usace.army.mil/reg/SWANCC/swanccnon.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (provid-
ing examples of the forms); see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter,
No. 05-02, Expiration of Geographic Jurisdictional Determinations of Waters of the
United States (June 14, 2005), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/rgls/
RGL05-02.pdf; see also supra text accompanying note 148.
326. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
327. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2227 (2006).
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tion 404 permit, or, as the recent district court decision in Chevron
Pipe Line suggests, a discharge of oil under the OPA .
While clarifying rules may seem like a good idea at first blush,
the reality of the federal rulemaking process should give the Corps
and EPA pause.3 20 Even under the most optimistic scenario, it will
likely take several years and millions of dollars for the agencies to
promulgate final rules. Once promulgated, litigation over those
rules seems inevitable and will result in several more years of un-
certainty. Thus, even if new regulations could effectively clarify the
scope of the Corps' authority under the Clean Water Act, they
cannot resolve the ongoing debate over congressional intent in
using the phrase "navigable waters" to describe the government's
jurisdiction under the CWA. Only Congress can address this issue,
and it should do so without delay so that the Corps and EPA are
not forced into needless regulatory proceedings.
B. Bases for ExtendingJurisdiction
While SWANCC and Rapanos suggest that one or more members
of the current Supreme Court have concerns about the govern-
ment's constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause over
certain waters that may be remote from navigable waters, "0 the
Court has never ruled on the full scope of the government's consti-
tutional powers over water resources.33 ' Thus, Congress plainly has
an opportunity to clarify the current confusion over federal au-
thority. Moreover, the level of confusion and dissonance over this
issue appears to worsen with every new decision from the Court.
The time has come for Congress to act. If Congress chooses to act,
it seems most likely that it will expand federal authority over water
resource activities that impact water quality beyond traditional
navigable waters. 32
328. See supra text accompanying notes 299-317.
329. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Re-
sponse to ProfessorSeidenfeld, 75 TEx. L. REv. 525 (1997).
330. See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 ("Even if the term 'the waters of the United
States' were ambiguous as applied to channels that sometimes host ephemeral flows of water
(which it is not), we would expect a clearer statement from Congress to authorize an agency
theory ofjurisdiction that presses the envelope of constitutional validity.").
331. The Court has made clear that water is an article of commerce and that state regu-
lation of water is subject to review under the dormant Commerce Clause. Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). But it has not ruled on the full scope of fed-
eral authority over water.
332. The current Congress will likely be wary of taking any action that directly impli-
cates state authority over water quantity. The "Wallop Amendment," adopted as part of the
1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act expressly provides:
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For several reasons, Congress should extend that authority to
the fullest extent possible. Most importantly, water resources are
far more integrated than the courts sometimes recognize.3 3 1 It is
not surprising that questions of constitutional power have arisen
under the CWA but not under the Clean Air Act because it is obvi-
ous that outdoor, ambient air cannot be easily confined inside
jurisdictional boundaries. 4 Water is more easily confined than air,
even when water occurs under natural conditions, and it is proba-
bly easier to control. But the hydrologic cycle suggests that air and
water resources are more similar than they are different because
even supposedly "isolated waters" play an integral role in the hy-
drologic cycle.335 Furthermore, establishing state or local standards
for wetlands regulation, effluent discharges, and nonpoint source
pollution are impractical and potentially burdensome on entities
operating in multiple jurisdictions, which is why so many states
support a comprehensive federal regulatory program.3 6 Finally,
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of
water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired
by this Act. It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been
established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local agen-
cies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution
in concert with programs for managing water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (g) (2000).
333. See U.S. Geological Survey, The Water Cycle, http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/
watercycle.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
334. On the other hand, indoor air quality is often the subject of state and local regula-
tion. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Sheryl-Lynn Carof, The Legal Control of Indoor Air
Pollution, 25 B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REv. 247, 254 (1998) ("[T]he Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), EPA, and many state agencies regulate indoor air quality
under various programs.").
335. See Ralph W. Tiner, Geographically Isolated Wetlands of the United States, 23 WETLANDS
494, 496 (2003), available at http://www.bioone.org/archive/0277-5212/23/3/pdf/iO2
7 7 -
5212-23-3-494.pdf; Environmental Protection Agency, Prairie Potholes, http://ww.epa.gov/
owow/weflands/types/pothole.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007); U.S. Geological Survey, The
Water Cycle http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
336. Thirty-three individual states as well as the District of Columbia joined together to
file an amicus brief in Rapanos in support of the United States and the Corps of Engineers,
in which they argued that:
Petitioners' narrow view of the Act, which excluded these waters from federal regula-
tion, would unavoidably impose additional, unnecessary burdens on downstream
States and their citizens. Each such State, when dealing with waters within state
boundaries that fail water quality standards mandated by the Clean Water Act, would
be forced to impose disproportionate limits on in-state sources to offset pollution
from out-of-state sources that the State cannot regulate. This could produce unfair
differences not only between dischargers in different States but also between dis-
chargers in different areas of a single State, since those areas downstream of other
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even "isolated waters" may play a critical role in protecting the
habitat of birds and other wildlife. The EPA estimates, for example,
that the prairie potholes of the Upper Midwest are home to more
than fifty percent of the migratory waterfowl of North America.1
7
Just how far the government can go with a federal program will
likely remain uncertain for some time, but it can go much farther
than the SWANCC and Rapanos decisions allow. Most obviously, the
federal government can extend jurisdiction beyond navigable wa-
ters to the fullest extent allowed under the Commerce Clause.
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that the Commerce
Clause gives the federal government the power to regulate only the
channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, and
action that substantially affects interstate commerce . While these
limitations have sometimes stymied federal efforts to regulate cer-
tain activities with a tangential relation to commerce, the courts
have had no trouble upholding environmental regulation on Com-
merce Clause grounds.3 4 0 Federal authority should be especially
easy to establish for a commodity like water, which exists in a global
cycle. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that
water is an article of commerce such that States may not adopt
rules that unduly restrict its delivery across state lines.341
Moreover, even the regulation of isolated wetlands would seem
to fit easily under the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. Fil-
burn.343 In Wickard, the Court held that Congress could regulate the
States might have to be regulated more strictly than other areas-all contrary to the
primacy of evenhanded discharge standards under the Act.
Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, Rapanos v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (No. 04-1034).
337. Environmental Protection Agency, Prairie Potholes, supra note 335.
338. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000).
339. See, e.g., id. at 605-19 (holding that Commerce Clause did not provide Congress
with authority to enact civil remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act inasmuch as
provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded
Congress's Commerce Clause authority since possession of gun in local school zone was not
economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce).
340. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
see alsoJohn C. Eastman, A Fistful of Denial: The Supreme Court Takes a Pass on Commerce Clause
Challenges to Environmental Laws, 2004 CATO Sup. CT. Rv. 469, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=907869.
341. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (holding that (1) groundwater is an article of
commerce and, therefore, subject to congressional regulations and (2) Nebraska statutory
restriction on withdrawal of groundwater from any well within Nebraska intended for use in
adjoining state violated Commerce Clause by imposing impermissible burden on interstate
commerce). Note that Sporhase involved groundwater, not a water body that was clearly cross-
ing state lines.
342. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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production of wheat produced on Filburn's farm even if it never
entered the stream of commerce and even if Filburn consumed all
of the wheat that he produced on the farm.3 43 The Court held that
Congress can regulate such wholly intrastate, non-commercial, and
relatively trivial wheat production so long as that production, when
viewed in combination with other wheat production, might have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.44 Given the cumulative
significance of wetlands for wildlife habitat, flood prevention, ero-
sion control, and water quality, it is hard to imagine that even
isolated wetlands would fail to satisfy the Wickard standard.
Beyond the Commerce Clause, Congress can also invoke federal
authority under the treaty power. Invoking the treaty power has
assured the government's ability to regulate activities that might
affect migratory birds, or international waters for which treaties
have been approved, including, for example, various migratory
bird treaties,3 5 the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty with Canada, 4"
and the 1944 United States-Mexico Treaty, which provides for the
allocation of water in the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Riv-
ers. 3 47 In Missouri v. Holland, which addressed the constitutionality
of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918,48 the Court made clear
that Congress can adopt all legislation necessary to carry out its
treaty obligations.4 9
It seems unlikely that any but the most insignificant waters or
wetlands would escape regulation if Congress chose to exercise the
full scope of its authority under the Commerce Clause and treaty
power. But if any waters were left unregulated, the government
could probably regulate such waters on public lands under the
Property Clause, which authorizes Congress to "make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States."3 50 This language would seem to
assure the government's plenary power to protect activities impact-
ing water resources on public lands.
343. Id. at 127-28.
344. Id.
345. See supra text accompanying note 295.
346. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Cr. Brit.,Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
347. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944,
59 Stat. 1219.
348. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (2000).
349. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
350. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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C. The Legislative Solution: Expanding Federal Power to
"Constitutional Waters"
Ever since the SWANCC decision, some members of Congress
have recognized a need for legislative action. Several bills first in-
troduced in 2003 propose important first steps toward clarifying
the scope of the federal government's jurisdiction over water re-
sources. The most recent iteration of this proposed legislation, The
Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005, was introduced
with fifteen co-sponsors in the Senate and 163 co-sponsors in the
House. It would redefine "waters of the United States" to mean:
... all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the terri-
torial seas, and all interstate and intrastate waters and their
tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (including inter-
mittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, natural ponds, and
all impoundments of the foregoing, to the fullest extent that
these waters, or activities affecting these waters, are subject to
the legislative power of Congress under the Constitution.52
From a semantic perspective, the chief concern with this pro-
posed legislation is that it fails to fix the fundamental flaw in the
current law. The current statute defines "navigable waters" to mean
"waters of the United States."0 3 The proposed legislation would
define "waters of the United States" to mean, essentially, all waters
subject to regulation under the constitution. But adding a defini-
tion to a phrase which is itself the definition of that loaded phrase
used in the statute-"navigable waters"-is unnecessarily compli-
cated, and this approach fails to acknowledge the repeated
admonition from a majority of the Court that Congress must give
meaning to the word "navigable."
Instead, Congress should simply abandon the phrase "navigable
waters" and substitute a new phrase that truly describes what Con-
gress intends-"constitutional waters." "Constitutional waters"
would stand in marked contrast to "navigable waters," and, as
351. For legislative tracking and a list of co-sponsors of this legislation, see the Library
of Congress's legislative information database, Thomas, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?dl09:SN00912:@@@L&summ2=m& (Senate) and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?dl09:HRO1356:@@@P (House).
352. The Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1356, 109th Cong. § 4(3)
(2005), amending S. 912, 109th Cong. § 502(23) (2005). As of October 29, 2006, the bill
remains in committee. The Library of Congress, S.912, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d09:s.00912: (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
353. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
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described above, would likely extend the government's permitting
authority to virtually all activities that could impact water resources.
While this new phrase might help avoid a debate over dictionary
meanings, such a broad delegation of power to federal agencies
will still raise some significant objections. Most obvious, perhaps, is
a concern about the proper division of power between the federal
government and the states. But so long as the government main-
tains its focus on water quality, states are likely to accept a strong
federal role. Unlike water quantity allocation, which has a long
tradition of state regulation and control," water quality regulation
has long been within the purview of the federal government,155 and
states and regulated entities alike benefit from the federal govern-
ment's capacity to establish uniform national standards.
Evidence of state support for a strong federal role is illustrated
by the fact that thirty-three states and the District of Columbia filed
an amicus brief in support of broad federal power over wetlands.356
By contrast, only two states supported the position of Rapanos and
Carabell.357 Moreover, most states are not idle observers in the regu-
lation of water quality. Under the cooperative federalism model of
the CWA, states are allowed to adopt their own programs to assume
responsibility for regulating pollution discharges under both the
3581section 402 and section 404 programs.
Expanding the scope of the CWA to constitutional waters will
not fully resolve the problem that arises with the current definition
of deciding which waters are subject to federal jurisdiction. As a
practical matter, however, it should make the problem much easier.
Under the current definition, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the government must first decide what waters are "naviga-
ble." Wetlands located adjacent to such waters are jurisdictional,
but someone must decide what it means to be adjacent. If the wet-
lands are not "adjacent" to "navigable waters" then the test
becomes even murkier. The government must decide whether the
wetlands have a significant effect on the chemical, physical, or bio-
logical integrity of navigable waters, which may be located many
miles away. While the courts may defer to agency judgments about
354. See supra note 332.
355. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 (2000).
356. See supra note 336 and accompanying text; Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2246 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (remarking that "it is noteworthy that 33 states plus the District of Columbia
have filed an amici brief in this litigation asserting that the Clean Water Act is important to
their own water policies ... these amici note, among other things, that the Act protects
downstream states from out-of-state pollution that they cannot themselves regulate.").
357. Brief for Alaska et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Rapanos, 126 S. Ct.
2208 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384).
358. See33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1444 (2000).
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these matters, the process for making these determinations will be
complicated, site specific, and expensive.
By contrast, making jurisdictional determinations for "constitu-
tional waters" should be relatively easy. First, virtually any land or
water resource that has much association with the hydrologic cycle
is likely encompassed by the new definition. More importantly,
though, as a practical matter, the Corps is almost certain to extend
its general permit program to ensure that waters of marginal eco-
logical importance are addressed routinely. Any waters with
anything more than marginal importance will plainly meet the new
jurisdictional standards. Thus, the line-drawing exercise for "con-
stitutional waters" is likely to be relatively painless, especially as
compared with the procedures that will have to be followed to im-
plement Rapanos.
Another potential problem with a broad definition, suggested by
Justice Scalia in his plurality opinion in Rapanos, concerns the im-
pact of broad federal jurisdiction on private property rights. But
this concern is not peculiar to federal regulation. It applies with
equal force to state or local regulation. Moreover, such rights will
have the same level of protection they have always had from gov-
ernment regulation and control. If they go "too far, 3 5 9if they
interfere with "distinct investment-backed expectations,"360 courts
may still conclude that the government must compensate the pri-
vate owner.3 6' That said, concerns that regulation of water quality
might occasionally result in takings claims should not be used as an
excuse to avoid the imposition of reasonable regulatory standards.
Moreover, takings claims will likely be rare, and cannot even be
362known until a decision on a permit application is first made.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has struggled to define the proper scope of
regulatory power over wetlands under the CWA. While one can
fairly argue that the Court's task would have been easier if it had
simply followed the congressional intent evident in legislative his-
tory, Congress deserves a fair share of the blame for using the
phrase "navigable waters" to describe the scope of the Clean Water
Act-a law that has nothing to do with navigation. By defining the
phrase ambiguously, Congress only compounded the problem.
359. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
360. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
361. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
362. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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The solution to these problems is not-as some of the Justices have
suggested-to have the agency clarify the law. After three Supreme
Court decisions and much agency guidance, the problems are too
convoluted to be addressed with another rule. Nor will the prob-
lems be solved by embedding another definition in the current
definition of "navigable waters" as some in Congress have pro-
posed. Rather, the solution requires a simple acknowledgement
that the historical reference to "navigable waters" was a mistake,
and that what Congress really meant was to allow water quality
regulation over all waters subject to federal constitutional author-
ity, i.e., "constitutional waters." By adopting this simple solution,
the federal government can get on with fulfilling its mandate to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters ....
363. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000).
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